Daniel Ores Pulver v. State
07-15-00112-CR
Tex.Dec 3, 2015Background
- Appellant Daniel Ores Pulver was stopped for speeding on I‑40; trooper Weller issued a warning but engaged in further questioning inside the patrol car.
- During the encounter appellant appeared extremely nervous, gave evasive or inconsistent answers about his itinerary, and misidentified the purported concert destination (Elton John in Chicago, which trooper’s check showed was false).
- Weller’s in‑car computer check showed appellant omitted prior drug‑related arrests from his stated criminal history.
- Weller asked to search the rental car ~11 minutes into the stop; appellant initially hesitated, then consented after Weller said he would call a canine. A K‑9 from ~50 miles away arrived ~25 minutes later and alerted; officers located ~2.67 kg of heroin in a rear door panel.
- Appellant moved to suppress on the ground the extended detention awaiting the dog was unreasonable; trial court denied the motion, a jury convicted, and punishment was enhanced. The State concedes any order requiring payment of appointed counsel fees should be removed.
Issues
| Issue | Appellant's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the continued detention to await a drug‑dog and subsequent search were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment | The stop extended beyond the time required to issue a warning; appellant was cooperative, had valid documents, and the itinerary/passenger story was consistent, so no reasonable suspicion justified prolonged detention | Trooper had articulable facts (extreme nervousness, inconsistent/illogical itinerary, false concert claim, omission of prior drug arrests); officers diligently sought a K‑9; detention to obtain olfactory dog inspection was reasonable | Trial court’s denial of suppression affirmed (stop and detention were reasonable under totality of circumstances) |
| Admissibility of testimony that appellant had undisclosed prior drug arrests | Testimony about prior drug arrests was prejudicial extraneous‑acts evidence and trial court should have performed a Rule 403 balancing | The testimony was vague, admitted only to explain why trooper developed suspicion; it was probative to explain detention and not unduly prejudicial; no limiting instruction was requested | Admission of the testimony not an abuse of discretion |
| Whether judgment may order appellant to pay court‑appointed attorney fees | Appellant indigent; assessment of appointed counsel fees improper without evidence of ability to pay | State agrees handwritten fee notation lacks record support and should be deleted | Judgment should be modified to remove any order requiring appointed counsel fees |
Key Cases Cited
- Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (Sup. Ct.) (traffic stops are investigatory detentions)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (Sup. Ct.) (reasonable suspicion standard for investigatory stops)
- United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (Sup. Ct.) (diligent pursuit and time‑reasonableness analysis for detentions)
- Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596 (Tex. Crim. App.) (K‑9 open‑air sniff as reasonable method to confirm/dispel drug‑transport suspicion)
- Estrada v. State, 30 S.W.3d 599 (Tex. App.—Austin) (analogizing traffic stop to investigative detention; K‑9 searches)
- Hamal v. State, 390 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. Crim. App.) (driver nervousness and misrepresentations can support continued detention)
- Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Crim. App.) (appellate review deference to trial court fact findings)