Daniel Johnson v. Rissie Owens
612 F. App'x 707
5th Cir.2015Background
- Daniel Johnson, convicted in 1977 of aggravated rape and released on parole subject to Texas Parole Special Condition “X” (sex-offender program) and later added conditions: no contact with ex-wife/children, no travel outside Texas without permission, and placement on Super Intensive Supervision Program (SISP) with electronic monitoring.
- Special Condition X permits parole officers to restrict computer and photographic equipment use absent written authorization; TBPP policy contemplates case-by-case tailoring.
- On release Johnson was initially denied all computer and photography access; later limited computer use was allowed only for employment and bill-paying.
- Johnson sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 raising as-applied First Amendment, Equal Protection, Ex Post Facto, Eighth Amendment, and substantive due process claims; district court granted defendants’ summary judgment and Johnson appealed.
- On appeal the Fifth Circuit vacated summary judgment only as to Johnson’s as-applied First Amendment challenge to the computer/photography restrictions and remanded for factual development, affirming the remainder of the district court’s judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| First Amendment: ban on photography and broad limits on computer/Internet use | Restrictions unconstitutionally burdened Johnson’s speech, association, information access with no individualized justification | Restrictions are reasonably related to public protection and reintegration because Johnson is a sex offender; discretionary lifting by PO makes them reasonable | Reversed as to these claims: summary judgment improper because defendants offered no individualized, factual connection between Johnson/offense and the restrictions; remanded to determine genuine factual dispute |
| Equal Protection: interstate travel ban | Travel restriction imposed vindictively based on false information from ex-wife; treated harsher than others | No evidence of intentional discrimination or disparate treatment; rational basis supports restriction | Affirmed: Johnson produced no evidence of intentional or clear discriminatory treatment or being treated differently without rational basis |
| Ex Post Facto: SISP, therapy, and parole fees imposed after conviction | New conditions and fees retroactively increase punishment or are so punitive as to be punishment | Conditions serve nonpunitive regulatory public-protection goals; fees are regulatory and not shown to be impossible to pay or punitive | Affirmed: no genuine fact issue that conditions were impossible or punitive; fees not shown to be punitive or impossible to pay |
| Eighth Amendment / Substantive Due Process: SISP and therapy cause serious harm | Therapy causes severe mental distress; SISP caused physical injury, sleep deprivation, humiliating incidents; defendants were deliberately indifferent | Parole officers addressed equipment problems and therapy compliance; no evidence of subjective deliberate indifference or ongoing unremedied harm | Affirmed: Johnson failed to show deliberate indifference or conscience-shocking conduct; no material fact dispute sufficient to prevail |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667 (5th Cir. 1997) (upholding supervised-release restriction as "reasonably necessary")
- Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (parole lies on continuum between imprisonment and probation)
- United States v. Locke, 482 F.3d 764 (5th Cir. 2007) (upholding Internet restriction in probation context tied to offense conduct)
- Doe v. Harris, 772 F.3d 563 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing First Amendment limits on restrictions for registered sex offenders)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (deliberate indifference standard for Eighth Amendment claims)
- Moore v. Avoyelles Correctional Ctr., 253 F.3d 870 (5th Cir. 2001) (intents-effects test for determining whether regulatory measures are punitive)