Daniel J. McLeod v. Louise M. Macul
139 A.3d 920
| Me. | 2016Background
- Daniel McLeod and Louise Macul divorced in 2012 after a 26-year marriage; Macul received $5,000/month general spousal support for 120 months in exchange for an unequal property division.
- At divorce McLeod reported ~ $376,728 income; Macul had no employment income and modest investment income.
- McLeod lost his job in June 2014 due to corporate restructuring, received a one-time $380,000 severance, and obtained new employment at substantially reduced pay and no benefits.
- McLeod moved to modify/terminate spousal support in 2014; the District Court (Romei, J.) found a substantial change, excluded the severance from gross income, criticized Macul for not seeking work, and retroactively terminated support to July 1, 2014.
- Macul appealed, arguing the severance should count toward McLeod’s gross income, the court improperly re-litigated factors considered at divorce, the court failed to consider relevant statutory factors in modification, and the termination was improperly retroactive.
Issues
| Issue | Macul's Argument | McLeod's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether McLeod’s severance payment must be included in gross income for spousal-support modification | Severance is employment-related final wages and should be included in gross income when assessing ability to pay | Court below treated severance as a one-time, non-ongoing payment and excluded it | Court: severance should be included (or at least prorated) in evaluating ability to pay; trial court erred to exclude it |
| Whether the trial court impermissibly relied on factors that existed at divorce (Macul’s employment potential) when finding a substantial change | Court improperly re-evaluated Macul’s pre-existing employment skills and inactivity—factors known at divorce—so cannot support substantial-change finding | McLeod relied on reduced ongoing earnings and loss of benefits to show change | Court: trial court abused discretion by relying, at least in part, on Macul’s unchanged unemployment (a pre-existing factor) in finding a substantial change |
| Whether the trial court considered all relevant statutory factors before modifying support | Court failed to adequately consider McLeod’s access to investments/pensions, length of marriage, Macul’s immigration constraint on work, and continued ability to pay | McLeod argued his reduced salary and new financial obligations justified termination | Court: record shows insufficient consideration of statutory factors; remand required for full analysis |
| Whether termination of support may be applied retroactively to the date of termination of McLeod’s job | Macul argued retroactive termination undermined original judgment and was premature after only two years of a ten-year term | McLeod sought retroactive relief to the date of his employment termination | Court did not resolve the retroactivity issue on remand because the substantial-change and factor-analysis errors required vacatur and reconsideration |
Key Cases Cited
- Pettinelli v. Yost, 930 A.2d 1074 (Me. 2007) (standard for reviewing spousal-support modification and two-step analysis)
- Walker v. Walker, 868 A.2d 887 (Me. 2005) (severance pay is income for support purposes in child-support context)
- Ellis v. Ellis, 962 A.2d 328 (Me. 2008) (substantial-change standard for modification)
- Hale v. Hale, 604 A.2d 38 (Me. 1992) (change must affect payor’s ability to pay or payee’s need)
- Gomberg v. Gomberg, 125 A.3d 724 (Me. 2015) (no substantial change where relevant circumstances known at divorce did not materially change)