Daniel G. Lilley Law Office, P.A. v. John P. Flynn III, 129 A.3d 936

Background

Flynn left Troubh Heisler in Feb 2009 to join Daniel G. Lilley Law Office, P.A. (LLO); Flynn and Lilley signed an MOU governing Flynn’s employment; Troubh, Flynn, and LLO signed an MOA addressing referral fees for cases Flynn brought from Troubh.
While at LLO Flynn obtained substantial contingency-fee recoveries (notably Paige and Braley); disputes arose over how fees would be divided among Flynn, LLO, and Troubh; Flynn cashed a $50,000 check labeled “Paige Compensation in full.”
Flynn left LLO in July 2011 and filed counterclaims after LLO sued for declarations and return of fees; the trial court denied a motion to consolidate these related matters with other pending cases (including Tucker v. Lilley).
After summary-judgment rulings narrowing issues, a jury trial awarded Flynn unpaid salary, found both parties breached the modified MOU, and apportioned attorney fees among Flynn, LLO, and Troubh for listed cases (e.g., Braley 25/75, Paige 90/10).
The trial court entered judgment, later issued an amended judgment identifying the specific cases subject to the fee splits, and Flynn appealed while LLO cross-appealed.
The Law Court vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to grant LLO’s motion to consolidate this case with the related actions (per Tucker), and held the court erred by submitting to the jury the question whether the MOA modified the MOU because the MOA unambiguously did not.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court abused discretion by denying consolidation with related cases	Flynn argued the cases should be consolidated before one fact‑finder (agreed consolidation appropriate)	LLO argued consolidation was necessary to avoid confusion and piecemeal adjudication	Court: denial was an abuse of discretion; remand with instructions to grant consolidation (per Tucker)
Whether the MOA modified the MOU	Flynn argued the MOA modified the MOU and the issue was factual for the jury	LLO argued the MOA did not alter the MOU and its language is controlling	Court: MOA unambiguous and did not modify the MOU; submitting that question to the jury was error
Whether the jury’s fee apportionments and breach findings were supported by evidence	Flynn contested fee divisions and breach allocation as unsupported	LLO asserted legal entitlement to fees and that some payments constituted accord and satisfaction (e.g., $50,000)	Court: because consolidation error required vacatur, the court did not resolve most substantive challenges on the merits (left for consolidated proceeding)
Whether trial court properly amended judgment post-appeal and procedural motions	Flynn argued court improperly altered judgment and refused discovery on finances	LLO contended court could act on timely post-judgment motions despite notice of appeal	Court: addressed that post-appeal amendment was permissible under rule for specified timely motions but vacated judgment on consolidation grounds; discovery ruling not resolved on appeal

Key Cases Cited

Tucker v. Lilley, 114 A.3d 201 (Me. 2015) (consolidation required where closely related cases must be resolved before a single fact‑finder)
Williams v. Inverness Corp., 664 A.2d 1244 (Me. 1995) (trial court has broad discretion in framing jury interrogatories on special verdict forms)
Reliance Nat’l Indem. v. Knowles Indus. Servs., Corp., 868 A.2d 220 (Me. 2005) (interpretation of unambiguous contract terms is a question of law)
State v. Palmer, 624 A.2d 469 (Me. 1993) (appellate courts may address recurring issues for guidance in the event of retrial)
State v. Almurshidy, 732 A.2d 280 (Me. 1999) (similar appellate guidance practice)