385 So.3d 504
Ala.2023Background
- In June 2020, attorney Daniel Flickinger posted a provocative comment on his personal Facebook page regarding George Floyd; the post itself was authored by Flickinger and truthful as to authorship and content.
- Lawrence T. King and his firm allegedly circulated a screenshot that combined Flickinger’s post with a manufactured ("counterfeit") social-media profile showing Flickinger’s professional photo and his employer (Wainwright, Pope & McMeekin, P.C. — WPM), creating the appearance the post was made in a professional capacity.
- WPM partners viewed the image, confronted Flickinger, and he resigned when told to do so or face other consequences.
- Members of a private Facebook group posted harsh comments calling Flickinger a "racist" and urging WPM to act; Flickinger alleged a conspiracy between King and group members.
- Flickinger sued King and his firm for defamation, invasion of privacy (false light and appropriation), and tortious interference with his employment; the trial court granted a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal with prejudice.
- The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the defamation and invasion-of-privacy claims but reversed dismissal of the tortious-interference claim and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Defamation — linking post to employer | Flickinger: the "counterfeit" profile and added comments falsely associated his political post with WPM and damaged his reputation. | King: the post was authored by Flickinger (truth), and accusations (e.g., "racist") are nonactionable opinion; no false factual assertion about misconduct. | Dismissed: court held the association screenshot was not alleged to have caused the kind of false, reputationally actionable imputation required for libel; many of the group statements were opinion and nonactionable. |
| Tortious interference with employment | Flickinger: King intentionally interfered with the employer-employee relationship by distributing the manufactured image and celebrating firings, causing his termination. | King: they merely alerted the employer and did not coerce or request termination; no wrongful intent. | Reversed (remanded): pleadings sufficiently alleged intentional interference at the motion-to-dismiss stage (timing and alleged conduct support inference of intent). |
| Invasion of privacy — false light and appropriation | Flickinger: placing him in a false, offensive professional light (false light) and appropriating his likeness for commercial/political benefit. | King: the allegedly publicized material was not sufficiently public (private group) and the statements were not highly offensive or commercially appropriative. | Dismissed: court found publicity threshold and falsity/offensiveness not adequately alleged for false light; no plausible allegation of commercial appropriation of a unique likeness. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mooneyham v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 802 So. 2d 200 (Ala. 2001) (truth is an absolute defense to defamation)
- Dolgencorp, LLC v. Spence, 224 So. 3d 173 (Ala. 2016) (elements of defamation under Alabama law)
- Finebaum v. Coulter, 854 So. 2d 1120 (Ala. 2003) (defamatory meaning judged by ordinary reader/listener)
- Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 2003) (publicity requirement for false-light privacy claims)
- Regions Bank v. Plott, 897 So. 2d 239 (Ala. 2004) (elements and standards for false-light invasion-of-privacy)
- White Sands Grp., L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 32 So. 3d 5 (Ala. 2009) (tortious-interference pleading standard; rejection of strict "coercion" requirement)
- Logan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 466 So. 2d 121 (Ala. 1985) (insulting labels and opinion typically nonactionable)
- Schifano v. Greene Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 624 So. 2d 178 (Ala. 1993) (commercial-appropriation privacy tort requires appropriation for defendant's commercial benefit)