Daniel Corp. v. Reed
291 Ga. 596
| Ga. | 2012Background
- SPI Club held two alcohol licenses issued July 2010 for two Atlanta clubs; City of Atlanta Code § 10-69(a) requires opening within nine months or automatic forfeiture; Daniel sued for mandamus to compel recognition of forfeiture; District court denied; SPI Club intervened and stipulations show two August 2010 events (birthday ~100, wedding ~50) with food/beverage service and third-party staffing; October 2010 event hosted by promoter with ~110 attendees, non-alcoholic beverages, DJ, venue rental charged; Daniel argues failure to open or use license means noncompliance; Court considered whether opening occurred within nine months and whether any use of license was required to satisfy “open for business.”
- Stipulated facts indicate bona fide business activity at both clubs, albeit irregular; no sale of alcohol occurred within first nine months of licenses; the parties agree on material facts for interpretation of § 10-69(a).
- The ordinance comprises subsection (a) (begin operation within nine months with automatic forfeiture for non-opening) and subsection (b) (automatic forfeiture after nine months of ceasing operation following initial opening).
- The court engages in plain-meaning interpretation of the text, treats forfeiture provisions with some caution, and harmonizes § 10-69 with related ordinances and definitional provisions regarding “establishment.”
- Judgment below denying mandamus affirmed; court did not address constitutional challenges to § 10-69(a).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does ‘open for business’ require regularity/continuity? | Daniel argues opening must be regular and ongoing. | SPI Club/City argues opening is a discrete point in time, not requiring regularity. | No regularity requirement; opening is a discrete start moment. |
| Must a license be used (selling alcohol) to satisfy ‘open for business’? | Daniel contends use of license is necessary. | SPI Club asserts opening need not involve actual use of license. | No use requirement; opening may occur without alcohol sales within nine months. |
Key Cases Cited
- Risser v. City of Thomasville, 248 Ga. 866 (1982) (statutory interpretation framework for ordinances)
- Opensided MRI of Atlanta v. Chandler, 287 Ga. 406 (2010) (plain meaning; look to text)
- Judicial Council of Ga. v. Brown & Gallo, 288 Ga. 294 (2010) (ordinary meanings of terms; interpret in context)
- Jones v. Douglas County, 262 Ga. 317 (1992) (read statutes to avoid narrowing/expanding operation)
- East West Express v. Collins, 264 Ga. 774 (1994) (construe related ordinances together when possible)
- Cisco v. State of Ga., 285 Ga. 656 (2009) (forfeitures; general rule disfavoring forfeitures)
- Monses v. State of Ga., 78 Ga. 110 (1886) (opening a place for business moment doctrine)
- City Council of Augusta v. Augusta-Aiken R. & Elec. Corp., 150 Ga. 524 (1920) (caption not controlling meaning)
