Daniel Cook v. Charles Ryan, 688 F.3d 598

This is Cook’s second federal habeas petition, with Martinez potentially altering the cause-and-prejudice framework for PCR defaults.
Arizona issued a death warrant setting August 8, 2012, while district court denied Cook’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion seeking relief from judgment.
Cook elected to represent himself at trial after waiving counsel, with pretrial counsel serving for about seven months.
Pretrial counsel obtained two mental-health evaluations and a competency hearing; Cook was ultimately sentenced to death after a sentencing hearing with three aggravating factors and no mitigating factors found.
Cook’s PCR history includes multiple petitions and counsels’ involvement; Martinez was decided after several post-conviction proceedings.
The district court denied Rule 60(b)(6) relief and a stay; the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding Martinez did not apply or did not provide relief, and no substantial pretrial IAC was shown.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Rule 60(b)(6) is a second or successive petition	Cook contends 60(b) relieves a final judgment due to Martinez-based cause.	State argues 60(b) does not constitute a new merits petition and is not barred by § 2244(b).	Rule 60(b)(6) not barred as second petition; Martinez relief unavailable.
Whether Martinez applies to Cook’s claims given Faretta waiver	Martinez should excuse default for trial IAC because PCR inefficacy harmed his trial defense.	Faretta precludes claiming ineffective assistance for self-representation; Martinez not applicable here.	Martinez does not apply; Faretta bars relief, and pretrial IAC not substantial.
Whether Cook’s pretrial IAC claim is substantial under Martinez	Pretrial IAC could be substantial and thus constitute cause for default under Martinez.	Pretrial counsel acted reasonably; information Cook withheld undermines prejudice; claim not substantial.	Pretrial IAC claim not substantial; Martinez relief denied.
Whether Cook is entitled to a stay of execution	Martinez-based relief and stay should be considered to delay execution.	No likelihood of success on merits and equities do not favor stay; substantial delay concerns exist.	Stay denied; no significant likelihood of success and equities weigh against relief.

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (establishes equitable, narrow cause-for-default exception if initial-review counsel ineffective and underlying trial IAC is substantial)
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant may waive counsel and must knowingly and intelligently do so; cannot later claim ineffective assistance)
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (procedural default rule; IAC in post-conviction proceedings generally cannot excuse default)
Lopez v. Ryan, 678 F.3d 1131 (2012) (discussion of Martinez applications in Ninth Circuit scope)
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007) (mitigation investigations and defendant’s ability to present evidence at sentencing)
Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150 (2001) (test for substantiality of an IAC claim under Martinez framework)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (defining standard for deficient performance and prejudice in ineffective assistance claims)
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (rule for when Rule 60(b) motions amount to second or successive petitions)
Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (stay standards and public-interest considerations)