Daniel Chippewa v. State, 332 P.3d 827

Chippewa was convicted of felony DUI and later probation violations; a former prosecutor was appointed to represent him but withdrew due to potential conflict relating to an earlier case.
Chippewa was re represented by the same former prosecutor at sentencing and during probation revocation, resulting in a unified sentence of nine years with six years determinate, suspended to probation for five years, later revoked with sentencing executed.
Approximately a year later, the former prosecutor filed a Rule 35 motion for relief from sentence, which was denied and an amended judgment entered.
Chippewa filed a pro se post-conviction petition alleging three ineffective-assistance claims; one asserted a conflict of interest due to conflicted former-prosecutor representation.
The district court granted relief on some claims but summarily dismissed the conflict-of-interest claim; Chippewa appealed challenging the summary dismissal.
On appeal, the court applied post-conviction standards, including evidentiary requirements, the possibility of summary dismissal, and whether a genuine issue of material fact existed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether conflicted counsel constitutes an ineffective-assistance claim.	Chippewa asserts conflict deprived counsel of effective representation.	State argues no deficient performance shown and no adverse effect established.	Summary dismissal proper; no proven adverse effect.
Whether Holloway/Sullivan exceptional theories apply to successive representation.	Claims fall under Holloway/Sullivan exceptions for conflicted/procurement of joint representation.	Exceptions not clearly applicable to successive representation; requires deficient performance analysis first.	Court did not decide applicability of Holloway/Sullivan to this case; focus remains on deficient performance.
Whether Chippewa proved deficient performance and adverse effect under Strickland analysis.	Defendant had an actual conflict that affected counsel's performance.	No plausible alternative defense strategy shown; no demonstrated adverse effect.	No deficient performance shown; no prejudice demonstrated; summary dismissal affirmed.

Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (U.S. 2002) (conflicts may trigger per se prejudice in some scenarios)
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (U.S. 1978) (exception for joint representation with timely objection)
Sullivan v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (U.S. 1980) (duty to inquire when conflict is known)
Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (U.S. 1981) (remanded to apply Sullivan standard in joint representation)
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (U.S. 1980) (establishes standard for conflicts of interest)
Dehlinger, 740 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 2014) (three-prong test for adverse effect under conflicted counsel)
Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2006) (analysis of conflicted representation in successive contexts)
United States v. Swisher, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Idaho 2011) (adverse-effect analysis in conflicted-counsel cases)