Daniel Brewington v. State of Indiana
2014 Ind. LEXIS 347
Ind.2014Background
- Daniel Brewington waged a years‑long, obsessive campaign after his divorce against the trial judge (Judge Humphrey) and the custody evaluator (Dr. Connor) via faxes, motions, and internet posts, accusing them of corruption, child abuse, and other misconduct.
- He publicly posted personal information including the judge’s and doctor’s home addresses, followed the doctor to court, published private photos, and made veiled statements about violence, firearms, and arson.
- A grand jury indicted Brewington on multiple counts including intimidation of a judge (felony), attempted obstruction of justice (relating to the doctor), perjury, and unlawful disclosure of grand jury proceedings. A jury convicted him on all counts except unlawful disclosure.
- The Court of Appeals reversed two misdemeanor intimidation convictions and partly reversed on double‑jeopardy grounds but otherwise affirmed; Brewington sought transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court.
- The Indiana Supreme Court performed independent constitutional review and addressed whether Brewington’s communications were protected speech (including defamatory hyperbole) or unprotected “true threats,” and whether instructional/general‑verdict errors or counsel ineffectiveness warranted reversal.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Brewington's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether statements accusing officials of misconduct constituted legally actionable threats or protected speech | Statements and surrounding conduct amounted to threats intended to place victims in fear and to obstruct justice | Much of the speech was political/hyperbolic criticism protected by the First Amendment; convictions rested on protected statements | Court distinguished protected defamatory hyperbole (protected absent proof of actual malice) from unprotected true threats; upheld convictions as to judge and doctor based on true‑threat evidence |
| Applicable standard for defamatory/embarrassment‑type threats under the intimidation statute (IC 35‑45‑2‑1(c)(6),(7)) | The statute criminalizes threats including exposure to ridicule or injury to reputation | Brewington argued First Amendment/actual‑malice protections preclude conviction based on such speech about public officials or matters of public concern | Court held that (c)(6),(7) implicate defamation law; where public officials or public‑concern issues are involved, the actual‑malice standard applies, severely limiting prosecutions under those subparts |
| Definition and proof of a “true threat” | True threat exists where, in context, speaker intended to place victim in fear of bodily harm; jury may infer intent from circumstantial evidence including publication of addresses and prior violent/obsessive conduct | Brewington urged an objective test or protection for veiled/ambiguous speech as political hyperbole | Court adopted a two‑part test: (1) speaker intended to place target in fear for safety (mens rea); and (2) an objectively reasonable person similarly situated would be likely to feel such fear; found both elements satisfied for judge and doctor |
| Whether instructional error / general‑verdict problem or ineffective assistance required reversal | Brewington argued the jury could have convicted based on protected speech because instructions covered all statutory threat categories, and defense counsel failed to request actual‑malice instructions | State argued the evidence supported true threats and counsel’s strategy was reasonable; errors were invited by defense | Court found a general‑verdict/instructional error existed but ruled it was invited error stemming from deliberate defense strategy (broad First Amendment instructions and reliance on protected‑speech framing); no ineffective assistance or fundamental error proved |
Key Cases Cited
- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (establishing actual‑malice standard for defamatory falsehoods about public officials)
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (true‑threat doctrine: context‑dependent inquiry whether conduct is intended to intimidate)
- Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (distinguishing hyperbolic opinion from defamatory factual assertions)
- Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (political hyperbole not a true threat in context)
- Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (First Amendment protects caustic political speech and parody)
- Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (protection for offensive public‑issue speech)
- Journal‑Gazette Co. v. Bandido’s, 712 N.E.2d 446 (Ind. 1999) (applying actual‑malice standard to matters of public or general concern under Indiana law)
- St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (reckless disregard defined for actual‑malice inquiry)
- Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (actual‑malice contours and protection of speech despite ill will)
- United States v. Prochaska, 222 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1955) (context shapes whether words are threatening)