Daniel Barker v. Patrick Conroy
921 F.3d 1118
D.C. Cir.2019Background
- Daniel Barker, an avowed atheist and former Christian minister, sought to serve as a House guest chaplain and submitted a secular invocation; Representative Pocan sponsored him and Barker provided an ordination certificate.
- The House Chaplain’s Office (Chaplain Conroy) denied Barker, initially citing that Barker was "ordained in a denomination in which he no longer practices," and later contending the House requires a religious prayer.
- Barker sued in federal court alleging an Establishment Clause violation (religion-favoring practice and discriminatory exclusion of atheists) and sought declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief against Conroy in his official capacity.
- The district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing and failure to state a claim; Barker appealed only the Establishment Clause claim against Conroy in his official capacity.
- The D.C. Circuit held Barker had Article III standing to challenge his exclusion (injury, traceability, redressability) and rejected political-question and Speech-or-Debate bars, but ruled Barker failed to state a claim because the House permissibly limits the opening prayer to religious prayers.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing | Barker was injured by denial of opportunity to deliver a secular invocation; Chaplain had discretion to allow guest chaplains | No causation: chaplain lacked authority to permit nonprayer remarks; Kurtz controls | Barker has standing: plausible that Chaplain had discretion; injury traceable and redressable |
| Political-question / Speech-or-Debate | Claim is justiciable; challenges application/interpretation that excludes atheists | Claim implicates House Rulemaking and Speech-or-Debate immunity | Justiciable: Rulemaking Clause does not bar constitutional review; Speech-or-Debate inapplicable here |
| Meaning of "prayer" under House rules | "Prayer" can reasonably include a secular invocation; House rules don't expressly require a deity | House, through counsel, interprets its rules to require a religious prayer; courts should defer to Congress's interpretation of its own rules | Court accepted House's post-complaint interpretation that opening prayer must be religious (deference to House) |
| Establishment Clause (exclusion of atheist) | Excluding atheists discriminates and violates neutrality; Conroy's stated reasons pretextual | Limiting legislative opening to religious prayer is within Marsh/Town of Greece tradition and constitutional | Even accepting discriminatory motive, relief (ordering secular invocation) is unavailable because House permissibly limits opening prayer to religious prayer; claim fails to state a claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (legislative prayer is historically rooted and can be consistent with the Establishment Clause)
- Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014) (legislative prayer is permissible so long as nondiscriminatory; tradition governs analysis)
- Kurtz v. Baker, 829 F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (challenger lacked causation where chaplains had no authority to permit secular remarks during prayer time)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (plaintiff bears burden to plead Article III standing at pleading stage)