Dane P. Abdool v. Pam Bondi, etc.
141 So. 3d 529
| Fla. | 2014Background
- Florida enacted the Timely Justice Act of 2013 to reduce delays in capital cases; several amendments affect counsel, public-records production, and warrant issuance.
- Petitioners (death-row inmates) sought emergency mandamus/all-writs relief to enjoin four statutory provisions as facially unconstitutional.
- Challenged provisions: (1) §922.052 (new Clerk certification and timeframes for Governor to issue warrant and warden to schedule execution); (2) §27.703(1) (higher "actual conflict" standard and court-determined substitute counsel); (3) §27.7045 (5-year disqualification for attorneys found twice to have provided constitutionally deficient representation); (4) §27.7081 (statutory public-records regime overlapping with Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852).
- The Court treated the petition as a mandamus matter, accepted jurisdiction, and reviewed the challenges as facial attacks (challenger must show no constitutional application exists).
- The Supreme Court upheld the challenged provisions on their face, finding them largely distinct from the prior DPRA defects and construable to avoid commandeering court ethical or procedural powers.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §922.052 intrudes on this Court’s rulemaking/separation-of-powers authority by conditioning/compelling warrants | §922.052 creates a mandatory time-driven warrant regime that truncates postconviction review and overrides this Court’s procedural rules (like DPRA did) | The provision regulates executive warrant issuance (an executive function), does not alter court procedural timelines, leaves clemency unconstrained, and is distinguishable from DPRA | Upheld: not a facial separation-of-powers violation — statute governs executive warrant process and is distinguishable from Allen/DPRA |
| Whether §922.052 violates due process, equal protection, or Eighth Amendment rights (by imposing a ‘‘time-certain’’ execution deadline or cutting off review) | Acts as a de facto execution deadline, risks erroneous certifications, may bar certiorari review and impair due process; treats capital defendants differently | No deprivation of protected interest; issuance contingent on clemency (which can follow certiorari); statute does not bar successive motions or automatically trigger execution | Upheld: no facial due process, equal protection, or Eighth Amendment violation |
| Whether §27.7045 (5-year disqualification after two findings of deficient representation) unlawfully intrudes on this Court’s exclusive authority over admission/discipline | Legislature encroaches on court’s exclusive power to regulate lawyer admission/discipline by disqualifying attorneys for practice in capital cases | Legislature may set qualifications/duties for statutorily created counsel offices (CCRC, RCC, registry) though not for constitutionally created offices; provision can be construed to exclude elected public defenders whose qualifications are constitutional | Upheld on its face: statute construed not to apply to constitutionally created public defender offices; facially valid for statutorily created counsel |
| Whether §27.7081 (codifying most of rule 3.852 but omitting certain procedural protections) improperly usurps Court rulemaking authority or denies due process | Statute displaces judicial procedural rules (e.g., hearings, deadlines, supplemental-records procedures), unlawfully intruding on court’s exclusive rulemaking | Statute mirrors much of rule 3.852 but omitted procedural provisions intentionally; omissions do not repeal the Court’s rules and the Court’s rules continue to govern where procedural provisions were omitted | Upheld on its face: statute does not facially encroach because Court rules remain controlling for procedural protections |
| Whether §27.703(1) forces counsel to disclose confidences (violating Rule Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.6) by shifting conflict-determination to courts | Statute compels disclosure of client confidences to prove an "actual conflict" and thus conflicts with court-regulated ethics and confidentiality rules | Courts can investigate conflict adequacy without forcing revelation of privileged communications; attorneys may disclose non‑confidential generalities to assist the court | Upheld on its face: statute can be read to require only non‑confidential disclosures and thus does not facially violate separation of powers/ethics rules |
Key Cases Cited
- Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So.2d 52 (Fla. 2000) (invalidating DPRA provisions that impermissibly altered court procedural rules in capital postconviction process)
- Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (U.S. 1978) (counsel’s representations about conflicts may warrant appointment of separate counsel; courts may inquire into basis without forcing disclosure of confidences)
- Johnson v. State, 78 So.3d 1305 (Fla. 2012) (statutory review of public defender conflict certifications; court may review adequacy without requiring confidential disclosures)
- In re The Florida Bar, 316 So.2d 45 (Fla. 1975) (judiciary’s inherent authority to adopt and enforce ethical rules for lawyers)
- Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So.2d 250 (Fla. 2005) (facial-challenge standard: challenger must show no set of circumstances where statute is valid)
- Massey v. David, 979 So.2d 931 (Fla. 2008) (substantive vs. procedural distinction and limits on legislative intrusion into court rulemaking)
- Chiles v. Phelps, 714 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1998) (Legislature may act unless statute is clearly contrary to the Constitution; separation-of-powers constraints explained)