Dandino, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Transportation, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 18188

Dandino, Inc., a household-goods motor carrier, applied to FMCSA to change its trade name; FMCSA approved but required Dandino to demonstrate full compliance within 30 days or face revocation.
Dandino failed to prove compliance within 30 days; FMCSA revoked its operating registration effective July 26, 2010.
Dandino operated and transported household goods on or about August 1, 2010 during the revocation gap; FMCSA later reinstated registration effective August 23, 2010.
FMCSA assessed a civil penalty for operating without required operating authority; after administrative proceedings it issued a final order affirming the penalty on June 23, 2011 (mailed June 24, 2011).
Dandino filed a petition for review in the Ninth Circuit on July 26, 2011; the primary threshold question was whether the § 521(b)(9) 30-day filing period runs from issuance or from actual receipt of the final agency order.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does the 30-day limitations period in 49 U.S.C. § 521(b)(9) begin?	The 30 days should run from actual receipt/notice of the final order.	The period runs from issuance/service of the final agency order.	30 days runs from actual notice (receipt) of the final order.
When is receipt presumed for mailed agency orders when actual receipt date is unknown?	Presume receipt three days after mailing (mailbox rule + 3-day rule).	Agency favored measuring from service/issuance (regulation says service date).	Rebuttable presumption that First-Class mail is received three days after mailing.
Is the DOT regulation (49 C.F.R. § 386.67(a)) controlling on the start of the limitations period?	N/A (Dandino relied on receipt timing, not the regulation).	The Agency argued its regulation fixed the start as service date.	Court refused to defer to agency on jurisdictional start; regulation not controlling.
Was the underlying penalty valid where Dandino operated during the revocation gap?	Dandino argued it remained registered/insured and revocation only affected "operating authority."	FMCSA: registration was revoked for failure to show compliance; operating without authority violated regulations.	Penalty affirmed: Dandino operated without required operating authority and violated 49 C.F.R. § 392.9a.

Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (statutory interpretation principle: start with text)
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432 (statutory interpretation canon)
Dierkes v. Dep’t of Labor, 397 F.3d 1246 (example where statute used "issuance")
Haroutunian v. INS, 87 F.3d 374 (example where statute used "issuance")
Stevedoring Servs. of Am. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 29 F.3d 513 (example where statute used "issuance")
Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer Cnty., Inc., 171 F.3d 1197 (mailbox rule presumption)
Mendez v. Knowles, 556 F.3d 757 (first-class mail delivery expectations)
Lindemood v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 566 F.2d 646 (three-day delivery assumption)
Cook v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 480 F.3d 432 (usual delivery time for first-class mail)
Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147 (Supreme Court assuming three-day receipt for mailed right-to-sue letter)
Payan v. Aramark Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 495 F.3d 1119 (measuring limitations from date right-to-sue letter arrived)
Ortez v. Washington County, 88 F.3d 804 (approximating receipt when date unknown)