985 F.3d 1284
11th Cir.2021Background
- Hickman hired as executive director of Spirit of Athens in Jan 2016; she and assistant Hines discovered opaque financial records, missing prior tax returns, and $61,000 listed as "other expenses" on 2015 returns.
- Treasurer kept books at home and refused to produce records; accountant prepared 2015 returns that Hickman questioned and then retracted her signature; board took no remedial action.
- Hickman retained an audit firm and informed the board and a county official; the board president promptly fired the audit firm and then fired Hickman and Hines.
- Hickman and Hines sued under the False Claims Act (FCA) anti-retaliation provision, alleging they were retaliated against for attempting to expose misuse of federal funds (TVA-related in-lieu-of-taxes payments).
- The funding path: TVA pays Alabama, Alabama distributes to counties, Limestone County statutorily pays Spirit of Athens — funds arrive by operation of law and Spirit made no claims or representations to the federal government.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Spirit of Athens, concluding plaintiffs lacked a reasonable belief that their employer submitted false claims to the federal government; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs engaged in protected FCA activity (retaliation) | Hickman/Hines contend their investigation and audit efforts were motivated by a reasonable belief Spirit committed FCA violations involving TVA funds | Spirit argues no FCA-protected activity because no false claim was submitted to the federal government and funds were received by operation of law | Held: No protected activity — plaintiffs lacked a reasonable belief that a false claim had been made to the federal government |
| Effect of 2009–2010 FCA amendments on required showing ("distinct possibility" vs "reasonable belief") | Plaintiffs urge adoption of a "reasonable belief"/objective standard under the amended text | Defendant contends existing precedent forecloses relief or the case fails regardless of standard | Held: Court declines to revisit precedent because plaintiffs’ claim fails under either the "distinct possibility" or "reasonable belief" standards |
| Whether TVA pass-through payments constitute a "claim" to the federal government | Plaintiffs argue TVA-related funds are federal and misuse implicates the FCA | Defendant argues funds were automatic statutory distributions; Spirit made no representations or claims to the federal government | Held: Payments were pass-through statutory distributions, not the result of any claim to the federal government; no FCA violation |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409 (2005) (describing FCA as prohibiting false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States)
- Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016) (FCA focus remains on those who present or induce submission of false claims)
- Childree v. UAP/GA AG CHEM, Inc., 92 F.3d 1140 (11th Cir. 1996) (articulated the Eleventh Circuit’s prior "distinct possibility" standard for FCA retaliation)
- Chorches v. Am. Med. Response, Inc., 865 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2017) (construed amended retaliation provision to protect some efforts to stop FCA violations even absent pending qui tam suit)
- United States ex rel. Grant v. United Airlines Inc., 912 F.3d 190 (4th Cir. 2018) (adopted an objective "reasonable belief" standard under the amended statute)
- Singletary v. Howard Univ., 939 F.3d 287 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (interpreted amended retaliation language consistent with protecting reasonable-belief efforts to stop violations)
- Ruckh v. Salus Rehab., LLC, 963 F.3d 1089 (11th Cir. 2020) (FCA liability arises from submission of a fraudulent claim to the government; general regulatory or ethical violations are insufficient)
