Dana Gold v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc., 3:14-cv-05373

Six named plaintiffs from six states purchased Lumber Liquidators’ Morning Star bamboo flooring and allege it is defectively designed/manufactured and that the company concealed defects and made misleading durability/warranty representations.
The Third Amended Complaint (TAC) asserted a nationwide class and eight state-based subclasses and pleaded nine statutory consumer claims (including the CLRA and UCL for California plaintiffs).
In pursuing class certification, plaintiffs narrowed their proposed class to purchasers of Morning Star Strand Bamboo flooring and sought certification of six state-based classes (CA, FL, IL, MN, PA, WV).
Lumber Liquidators opposed class certification and, after plaintiffs’ reply further narrowed/broadly altered class definitions, moved for leave to file a surreply; plaintiffs then moved for leave to amend the complaint to conform to the narrower definitions.
The Court applied Rule 15(a) and the Foman factors (with prejudice to the defendant as the key factor) and (1) granted leave to amend to narrow the product definition to Morning Star Strand Bamboo and (2) denied leave to expand the California class to include “persons/entities” or to remove the "for personal, family, or household use" limitation.
The Court allowed plaintiffs to file a Fourth Amended Complaint and permitted limited supplemental briefing (15 pages) on how the amended definitions affect the pending class-certification and Daubert motions, with oral argument reset.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether court may consider amended class definitions at class-certification stage	Plaintiffs sought leave to amend; narrowing the class should be allowed and is procedural	Lumber Liquidators argued courts should not consider class definitions that differ from the complaint without leave to amend	Court may consider amended definitions because plaintiffs sought leave; prior cases refusing to consider changes involved no motion to amend
Whether narrowing product definition to "Strand Bamboo" is permissible	Narrowing reduces scope, eases manageability, and does not prejudice defendant	Defendant claimed prejudice because discovery and expert work focused on broader product line	Granted: narrowing is allowed; no undue prejudice shown
Whether expanding CA class to add "persons/entities" and remove consumer-use limitation is permissible	Plaintiffs claimed the change merely clarifies intent and is not substantive	Defendant argued expansion adds whole new categories of purchasers and product uses, prejudicing discovery and expert work	Denied: expansion would cause undue prejudice and is not merely clarification
Whether leave to amend is barred by undue delay, bad faith, or other Foman factors	Plaintiffs argued liberal Rule 15 standard applies and no bad faith/delay	Defendant cited undue prejudice and procedural unfairness	Court found no bad faith/delay but found undue prejudice as to CA expansion; thus partial grant/partial denial

Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2001) (Rule 15 policy applied liberally)
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (U.S. 1962) (factors permitting denial of leave to amend)
Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (prejudice is the most important Foman factor)
Sonoma Cty. Ass’n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma Cty., 708 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2013) (application of Foman factors in leave-to-amend analysis)
Abdeljalil v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 306 F.R.D. 303 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (narrowing a proposed class typically does not prejudice defendant)
Roger v. Epson Am., Inc., [citation="648 F. App'x 717"] (9th Cir. 2016) (burden of proposing a narrower class falls on plaintiff)