Dana Easterling v. State of Mississippi
238 So. 3d 1174
| Miss. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Easterling pled guilty to cocaine possession in 2011, receiving a 15-year sentence with 10 years suspended.
- He was arrested on December 27, 2013, on charges including possession of a controlled substance, and an arrest warrant for violating post-release conditions issued January 27, 2014.
- Easterling remained incarcerated, filed a grievance and habeas petition in July 2014, and requested a continuance of the August 1, 2014 revocation hearing until after grand jury action.
- A revocation hearing was held September 17, 2014 after indictments on two possession counts; the circuit court revoked his suspended sentence.
- Easterling filed a post-conviction-relief (PCR) motion arguing the revocation hearing was untimely under due process and under the 2014 amendments to Mississippi Code § 47-7-37 (House Bill 585).
- The circuit court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing; the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether H.B. 585 (2014 amendments to § 47-7-37) applies to revocation hearings that occurred before the statute’s effective date | Easterling: time limits in § 47-7-37 (72‑hour preliminary hearing, 21‑day revocation hearing, 30‑day dismissal) should apply and require relief | State: statute addresses revocations but argued limits apply only to technical violations (and relied on § 47‑7‑37.1 to preserve felony revocations) | Court: H.B. 585 cannot be applied retroactively to Easterling; statutes operate prospectively absent clear expression (following Fisher v. Drankus) |
| Whether § 47‑7‑37’s time limits apply only to technical violations and not to alleged felonies | Easterling: statutory time limits apply to his case regardless of offense type | State: suggested limits pertain to technical violations and felony/absconding revocations governed differently | Court: did not need to decide; resolved case on nonretroactivity grounds and noted § 47‑7‑37.1 (enacted later) would affect scope but was not yet effective |
| Whether delay in holding revocation hearing violated due process and required reversal | Easterling: delay violated his Morrissey due‑process right to a timely revocation hearing | State: timely procedures not required to remedy absence because no showing of prejudice; hearing occurred and defendant offered no defense | Court: Recognized Morrissey right but affirmed because Easterling failed to demonstrate prejudice from the delay; lack of prejudice is fatal to relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Fisher v. Drankus, 204 So. 3d 1232 (Miss. 2016) (statutes construed prospectively absent clear retroactive intent; H.B. 585 not retroactive)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (due‑process protections required at revocation hearings)
- Villarreal v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 985 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1993) (prejudice required to obtain relief for delayed revocation proceedings)
- Presley v. State, 48 So. 3d 526 (Miss. 2010) (failure to hold preliminary hearing is harmless absent prejudice)