242 So. 3d 107
Miss.2018Background
- On April 14, 2010, Jessica Goodwin and her four‑month‑old daughter were abducted from Goodwin’s home by armed men; Goodwin was forced into a car, raped, and her father was extorted for $500 to secure their return.
- Damion Pace was indicted on burglary (with intent to commit larceny), two counts of kidnapping (adult and infant), forcible rape, and extortion. Jury acquitted on rape but convicted on two kidnappings, extortion, and — although robbery was not charged — returned a verdict form reading "Count I (Robbery) guilty as charged." The trial court entered judgment convicting Pace of robbery and sentenced him consecutively.
- Trial evidence included Goodwin’s eyewitness testimony, Pace’s postarrest statement implicating himself, and DNA linking semen found in the sexual assault kit to co‑defendant Darrin Wilson (not Pace).
- After verdict, the trial court amended its judgment to state the jury had "charged" Pace with robbery and confirmed a robbery conviction, despite there being no robbery indictment or instruction.
- Pace appealed, arguing (1) trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict (sufficiency), (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel (failure to renew directed verdict/post‑trial motions; failure to suppress confession or call stepfather to testify), and (3) the conviction for robbery was invalid because robbery was not charged and is not a lesser‑included of burglary.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Pace) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of robbery conviction where indictment charged burglary | Jury intended to convict robbery; conviction should stand | Robbery was not indicted; court cannot amend indictment or convict of unindicted felony | Vacated and rendered: robbery conviction and sentence vacated as plain error because robbery was not charged and is not a lesser‑included offense of burglary |
| Denial of motion for directed verdict / sufficiency of evidence | State’s evidence was insufficient to convict Pace of kidnapping/extortion; directed verdict should have been granted | Evidence (Goodwin’s testimony and Pace’s confession) and aider‑and‑abettor theory supported convictions | Not preserved on appeal (Pace failed to renew directed verdict or move for JNOV); alternatively, courts conclude sufficiency supports convictions and no reversal |
| Ineffective assistance — failure to file post‑trial motions (JNOV/new trial) | Counsel’s failure was deficient and prejudicial; motions could have resulted in reversal | Failure was deficient but not prejudicial because evidence supported convictions; no reasonable probability outcome would differ | Counsel’s omission was deficient but Pace failed to show prejudice; claim rejected |
| Ineffective assistance — failure to suppress confession / present stepfather’s testimony | Trial counsel should have moved to suppress; stepfather would have testified Pace asked for a lawyer, so confession should have been excluded | Officers testified Miranda warnings given and no request for counsel; trial court could credit officers over stepfather | No prejudice shown: trial court might have credited officers’ testimony; suppression is not clearly warranted; claim rejected |
Key Cases Cited
- Berryhill v. State, 703 So. 2d 250 (Miss. 1997) (only a grand jury may charge a defendant with a felony; court may not amend the substance of an indictment)
- Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (U.S. 1960) (indictment requirement limits prosecutorial scope of jeopardy)
- Holland v. State, 656 So. 2d 1192 (Miss. 1995) (failure to renew directed verdict or file JNOV preserves or forfeits sufficiency claims; counsel’s omission can be deficient)
- McClain v. State, 625 So. 2d 774 (Miss. 1993) (standards for directed verdict/JNOV review)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two‑part ineffective assistance test: performance and prejudice)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981) (interrogation must cease once the accused requests counsel)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (prosecution must show warnings and voluntary waiver before admitting custodial statements)