Damien Preston v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 902 F.3d 365

Background

In 2000 Kareem Williams was shot and later died; Damien Preston was convicted of third-degree murder and sentenced to 20–40 years. His brother Leonard Presley was involved and later convicted; Presley gave prior statements at his own trial and to police.
At Preston’s trial the Commonwealth introduced Presley’s police statement and his prior trial testimony as substantive evidence after Presley refused to answer virtually all substantive cross-examination questions at Preston’s trial, responding largely "no comment."
Trial counsel objected on Pennsylvania evidence-law grounds but did not assert a federal Confrontation Clause objection; direct-appeal counsel and later PCRA counsel likewise failed to preserve/press a trial- counsel-ineffectiveness claim for that omission.
Preston petitioned for federal habeas relief arguing (1) admission of Presley’s prior statements violated the Confrontation Clause; (2) trial counsel ineffective for failing to raise that objection; and (3) PCRA counsel ineffective for failing to preserve the IATC claim (invoking Martinez to excuse procedural defaults).
The District Court denied relief; on appeal the Third Circuit held the Confrontation Clause was violated because Presley refused to answer substantive cross-questions, but Preston’s Confrontation Clause claim was procedurally defaulted. The court found Martinez excused the procedural default of the IATC claim but Strickland prejudice was not shown, so habeas relief was denied.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether admission of Presley’s prior statements violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause	Preston: admitting Presley’s police statement and prior testimony violated right to meaningful cross-examination because Presley refused to answer substantive cross-questions	Commonwealth: no court-imposed restriction on cross-examination; limited nonresponsive answers did not deprive Preston of a fair confrontation; error (if any) was harmless	Held: Use of Presley’s prior statements violated Confrontation Clause where witness refused to answer substantive cross-examination questions, per Douglas and related precedent
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object on Confrontation Clause grounds	Preston: counsel’s failure to raise federal objection was objectively unreasonable and not strategic	Commonwealth: counsel preserved an evidentiary objection; no deficient performance or prejudice	Held: Performance prong satisfied (counsel deficient) because failure to raise Confrontation objection was not reasonably strategic
Whether PCRA/post-conviction counsel’s failure to raise the IATC claim excuses procedural default under Martinez v. Ryan	Preston: PCRA counsel’s omission caused default and was constitutionally deficient, so Martinez allows review of IATC claim	Commonwealth: Martinez does not apply; or claim not substantial	Held: Martinez applies — PCRA counsel’s failure excused default; IATC claim is substantial enough to proceed under Martinez framework
Whether Preston was prejudiced under Strickland (but-for effect) so that IATC can excuse default of Confrontation claim	Preston: admission of Presley’s statements materially contributed to verdict; without them jury might have acquitted or convicted only on different theory	Commonwealth: Presley’s statements were cumulative of strong evidence (Butler, medical examiner, physical evidence); any error harmless; no reasonable probability of different outcome	Held: Prejudice prong not satisfied — no reasonable probability of different result; admission was harmless given cumulative and corroborating evidence, and accomplice-liability instruction meant conviction could stand

Key Cases Cited

Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) (Confrontation Clause violated where witness refuses substantive cross-examination and prior statements are admitted)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel: performance and prejudice)
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (procedural-default exception where initial-review-collateral counsel’s ineffectiveness can excuse default of trial-ineffectiveness claims)
Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000) (procedurally defaulted IATC claim can serve as cause only if that ineffective-assistance claim itself is properly presented)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial out-of-court statements absent opportunity for cross-examination)
Owens v. United States, 484 U.S. 554 (1988) (Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for meaningful cross-examination, not perfect cross-examination)
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985) (per curiam) (limits on cross-examination may implicate Confrontation Clause)
United States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971) (prior statement use can violate confrontation when witness refuses to testify)
United States v. Torrez-Ortega, 184 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999) (similar rule applying Douglas logic to refusal-to-testify situations)