Damarcus S. Ex Rel. K.S. v. District of Columbia
190 F. Supp. 3d 35
| D.D.C. | 2016Background
- Student Damarcus S., diagnosed with an intellectual disability, attended DCPS since 2006 and made minimal academic progress (literacy/math at kindergarten–2nd grade levels by 8th grade). Evaluations in Feb. 2013 showed very low cognitive and achievement scores and significant receptive-expressive language deficits.
- Plaintiffs (mother K.S. on behalf of Damarcus) filed multiple due process complaints (May 2013, Jan. 2014, Dec. 2014) alleging inadequate evaluations, deficient IEPs (2011–2014), lack of an FBA/BIP, and seeking compensatory education and reimbursement for independent evaluations.
- Hearing Officer found most claims time-barred or meritless but held District denied FAPE by failing to provide a BIP in 2013–2014 and awarded 50 hours of behavioral support; she awarded reimbursement only for one IEE (behavioral), not the neuropsychological IEE.
- On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court (Huvelle, J.): (1) adopted the Third Circuit’s reasoning that §1415(b)(6) restates the §1415(f)(3)(C) two-year filing rule (rejecting a 2+2 remedy cap); (2) remanded for finer-grained statute-of-limitations analysis of pre-December 2012 claims; (3) found 2013–2014 IEPs substantively deficient for failing to respond to lack of progress and for reducing speech-language services, but remanded to develop an appropriate compensatory remedy; (4) reversed denial of reimbursement for the neuropsychological IEE and ordered reimbursement; and (5) dismissed unexhausted LRE claim and declined to order a court-imposed specific IEP.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper statute-of-limitations construction under IDEA (§1415) | Plaintiffs: filing within two years of discovery entitles full relief; oppose a 2+2 cap | District: 2+2 bar (remedy cap) limits recoverable violations to two years before filing | Court: Adopts Third Circuit (G.L.) view that (b)(6) restates (f)(3)(C); rejects 2+2 remedy cap; remands for individual KOSHK analyses |
| Timeliness of pre-Dec. 2012 claims | Plaintiffs: key discovery occurred June 2014 (expert IEE) so later claims timely | District: plaintiffs knew of lack of progress earlier and had filed 2013 DPC; claims accrued earlier | Held: Many claims accrued no later than Mar. 4, 2013 (IEP meeting when Feb. 2013 evals disclosed); hearing officer’s blanket dismissal of pre-Dec.2012 claims was erroneous and must be reconsidered on a claim-by-claim basis |
| Adequacy of Feb. 2013 evaluations and resulting 2013–2014 IEPs | Plaintiffs: evaluations flawed/incomplete and IEPs failed to address score discrepancies, lacked research-based methods, measurable baselines, and showed repeated unchanged goals; cuts to SLP services harmed FAPE | District: evaluations were sufficient; disagreements over interpretation are educational choices; IEPs provided specialized/research-based instruction where practicable; programs (Edmark/Attainment) were reasonable | Held: Evaluations provided usable data; but IEPs were substantively deficient for failing to respond to demonstrated lack of progress and for reducing speech-language services; denial of FAPE remanded for equitable remedy development |
| Reimbursement for neuropsychological IEE | Plaintiffs: District failed to initiate due process or provide IEE at public expense, so reimbursement required | District: plaintiffs withdrew IEE request or unreasonably refused district’s partial offer | Held: District did neither fully; court orders reimbursement for Dr. Levisohn neuropsychological IEE |
| Compensatory relief for missing BIP/behavior supports | Plaintiffs: 50 hours is inadequate; hours should be usable for broader educational services and not time-limited | District: award may be properly limited to behavioral services and time | Held: Restriction to behavioral services may be read broadly; court permits hours for reasonable non-behavioral educational uses; temporal forfeiture (use by June 30, 2016) was arbitrary and struck; size of award is insufficient given behavioral impact — remanded to hearing officer to develop appropriate remedy |
| Section 504 claim for discrimination | Plaintiffs: Section 504 claim duplicates IDEA and would permit expert fees; conduct shows gross negligence | District: IDEA framework controls; plaintiffs cannot show discrimination/bad faith | Held: Section 504 requires showing of bad faith or gross misjudgment; plaintiffs did not meet that higher standard; 504 claim dismissed |
| Request for court-ordered specific future IEP components | Plaintiffs: court should order specific programs (e.g., Wilson/Lindamood-Bell, BIP, transition plan) | District: courts should not supplant school’s role; recent 2015 IEP may already address issues | Held: Court declines to order specific programmatic IEP components; remand to hearing officer for remedy and development of appropriate IEP matters if needed |
Key Cases Cited
- Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (standard of review and need for reasoned findings; remand where record lacks pertinent findings)
- Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (burden on party challenging administrative IDEA decision)
- Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982) (IEP must be reasonably calculated to confer meaningful educational benefit; courts not to substitute educational policy judgments)
- G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 2015) (statutory construction rejecting 2+2 remedy cap; §1415(b)(6) restates filing deadline in §1415(f)(3)(C))
- Forest Grove School Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2009) (broad remedial purpose of IDEA; reimbursement context)
- Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (burden of proof in IDEA administrative proceedings rests with the party seeking relief)
- Boose v. District of Columbia, 786 F.3d 1054 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (discussion of child-find obligations under IDEA)
- Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1982) (Section 504 requires showing something more than negligence; discrimination/bad faith standard)
- B.D. v. District of Columbia, 817 F.3d 792 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (court may find requested IEP relief moot where district adopts appropriate IEP subsequently)