DALY v. BERRYHILL, 308 Ga. 831

Shane Berryhill underwent cardiac catheterization with stent placement after abnormal stress testing and was prescribed multiple cardiac medications and blood thinners.
Postoperative instructions (to Berryhill and his wife) included no strenuous activity and no lifting, bending, or stooping for about one week; there was some testimony of conflicting time frames.
Five days after the procedure Berryhill walked through rough terrain, climbed an 18-foot deer stand while carrying a rifle, fainted at the top, and fell, sustaining vertebral fractures.
Plaintiffs sued Dr. Dale Daly and Savannah Cardiology alleging negligent prescribing caused Berryhill to faint; at trial the court gave an assumption-of-risk jury instruction over plaintiffs’ objection.
The jury returned a defense verdict; the Court of Appeals reversed, holding no evidence Berryhill knew the specific risk of fainting; the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court held there was at least slight evidence supporting the assumption-of-risk instruction (so the trial court did not err); the Court did not decide the separate avoidance-of-consequences charge question.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether slight evidence justified an assumption-of-risk jury instruction	Berryhill had no evidence he knew the specific risk of fainting from medication or exertion, so instruction was improper	Berryhill received explicit post-op restrictions and a competent adult should be charged with knowledge of the obvious cardiovascular risks of violating them; slight evidence suffices	Reversed Court of Appeals: slight evidence (explicit instructions + major surgery + voluntary strenuous activity) was enough to submit assumption of risk to jury
Whether the avoidance-of-consequences jury charge was erroneous	Plaintiffs argued at trial it was improper	Defendants argued it was proper and COA upheld it	Not addressed by this Court (plaintiffs waived/declined to cross-petition)

Wainwright v. State, 305 Ga. 63 (2019) (slight-evidence standard can authorize a jury instruction)
Jones v. Sperau, 275 Ga. 213 (2002) (jury may infer necessary facts from circumstantial evidence)
Vaughn v. Pleasent, 266 Ga. 862 (1996) (assumption of risk requires actual subjective knowledge of the danger)
Muldovan v. McEachern, 271 Ga. 805 (1999) (elements of assumption of the risk: actual knowledge, appreciation, voluntary exposure)
Landings Assn., Inc. v. Williams, 291 Ga. 397 (2012) (common-sense obvious risks may be imputed to competent adults)
Bourn v. Herring, 225 Ga. 67 (1969) (obvious risks—like drowning—are chargeable to competent persons)
Southland Butane Gas Co. v. Blackwell, 211 Ga. 665 (1955) (historic formulation that obvious dangers may bar recovery)
Berryhill v. Daly, 348 Ga. App. 221 (2018) (Court of Appeals decision reversing trial court on assumption of risk)