937 F.3d 1009
7th Cir.2019Background
- On Nov. 15, 2010, Dallas Green ran from an unmarked police vehicle in a Citgo parking lot; officers observed him drop and pick up an item they believed was a handgun.
- Officer Nwagwu pursued and fired once in the lot; Officer Junious later caught Green in a backyard, testified Green raised a gun, and fired five shots, wounding Green. Green denied ever having a gun.
- Police later recovered a handgun about 50 feet from the shooting site.
- A Cook County judge revoked Green’s probation, finding he possessed a gun during the Citgo encounter.
- Green sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and failure to intervene; after motions, only the excessive-force claim against Officer Junious went to the jury, which returned a verdict for the officer.
- Green sought a new trial primarily arguing the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the state probation-revocation finding that he possessed a gun was preclusive; the district court denied the motion and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a state-court probation-revocation finding that Green possessed a gun precluded Green from testifying he was unarmed and required a preclusion instruction ("Gilbert instruction"). | Green argued the revocation finding related only to possession at the Citgo lot and did not foreclose testimony that he was unarmed in the backyard when Junious shot him; he also contended the instruction’s wording and frequency were prejudicial. | Defendants argued the state finding established the factual predicate (Green had a gun that night) and thus issue preclusion applied; the Gilbert-form instruction was appropriate and its timing/adaptation was within the court’s discretion. | Court held the revocation finding had preclusive effect under collateral-estoppel principles; the Gilbert-style instruction was proper, reasonably worded and appropriately repeated during testimony. |
| Admissibility of fingerprint lab testimony (McEldowney) that no usable prints were found on the recovered handgun. | Green wanted the lab testimony to support his claim he did not possess the gun. | Defendants argued that admission would directly contradict the state-court finding and the preclusion instruction. | Court held exclusion was not an abuse of discretion because the testimony would undermine the preclusive state finding. |
| Judge’s interruption of officer’s closing to remind jury to disregard certain testimony. | Green asserted the interruption was improper and prejudicial. | Defendants and district court treated the reminder as a permissible curative instruction to adhere to preclusion. | Court deemed the argument undeveloped and waived; no reversible error shown. |
| Admission of Green’s 2009 felony conviction evidence. | Green argued it should have been excluded under Rule 403. | Defendants noted Green himself elicited the conviction on direct examination. | Court held Ohler bars Green from claiming error he invited by testifying about his prior conviction. |
Key Cases Cited
- Gilbert v. Cook, 512 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2008) (recommending jury instruction implementing issue-preclusion when state adjudication contradicts plaintiff’s testimony)
- Sanchez v. City of Chicago, 880 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2018) (state criminal judgment can have collateral-estoppel effect in subsequent § 1983 suit)
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1994) (bar on civil suits that would imply invalidity of a criminal conviction)
- Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (U.S. 1997) (Heck doctrine extends to prison disciplinary rulings)
- Clarett v. Roberts, 657 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2011) (standard of review for denial of a new trial)