2 F. Supp. 3d 938
N.D. Tex.2014Background
- This case concerns a declaratory judgment interpretation of Texas Local Government Code §192.007(a) regarding recording of interim actions related to deeds of trust.
- Dallas County originally filed suit in state court against MERSCORP, MERS, and Bank of America, later removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. §1332.
- The Court previously dismissed the substantive §192.007 damages claim for lack of a private right of action, but left a declaratory judgment claim unresolved.
- Mediation resolved most claims; only the §192.007 declaratory judgment claim remained, and Dallas County’s private counsel withdrew from the case.
- The Court granted Defendants’ summary judgment on the §192.007 declaratory claim, holding no private right of action exists and DJA cannot create one; alternative readings were rejected.
- Dallas County separately moved for reconsideration of the prior order, which the Court denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Counties may obtain a declaratory judgment on §192.007's meaning without a private right of action. | Dallas County contends §192.007 is mandatory and enforceable via declaratory relief. | Defendants argue no private right of action exists and DJA cannot supply one. | Counties cannot obtain declaratory relief; DJA does not create a private right of action. |
| Does §192.007 require recording of interim documents such as assignments of deeds of trust? | Counties argue the language is mandatory and requires current recordation. | Defendants argue §192.007 is permissive or does not apply to transfers of notes; no duty to record absent a private right. | The statute does not require mandatory recordation of interim assignments; interpretation favors no duty to record. |
| Whether the DJA can provide relief when a statute lacks a private right of action. | DJA is procedural and cannot create a private right of action; thus no declaratory relief is available. | DJ A cannot be used to create an independent private right of action; relief denied. | |
| Whether Green/Hudson/Reinagel support Counties’ interpretation of §192.007. | Court finds those authorities persuasive but ultimately adopts the majority view that §192.007 does not mandate recording of interim instruments. |
Key Cases Cited
- Green v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 937 F. Supp. 2d 849 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (§ 192.007 not a requirement to record assignments; mere administrative directive)
- Hudson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 541 Fed.Appx. 380 (5th Cir. 2013) (§ 192.007 does not impose a duty to record the assignment of the deed of trust)
- Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 735 F.3d 220 (5th Cir. 2013) ( dicta; supports view §192.007 is procedural, not a prerequisite to validity of assignments)
- Reid v. Aransas County, 805 F. Supp. 2d 322 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (illustrates DJA cannot create a private right of action)
- Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666 (1960) (DJ A not an independent jurisdictional basis; prescribes remedial scope)
- Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995) (declaratory judgments are discretionary; not a private action source)