Daley v. A.W. Chesterton, Inc.
37 A.3d 1175
| Pa. | 2012Background
- Daley was diagnosed in 1989 with pulmonary asbestosis and squamous-cell carcinoma of the lung from asbestos exposure.
- Daley and spouse filed a 1990 personal injury action seeking damages for those conditions; they settled in 1994.
- In 2005, Daley was diagnosed with malignant pleural mesothelioma and a new suit was filed against U.S. Supply Co., Duro-Dyne Corp., Chesterton, and others.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment contending the two-disease rule barred a second malignant-disease action and that, historically, Pennsylvania law limited to a single action; statute-of-limitations issues were argued.
- The trial court granted summary judgment; the Superior Court vacated, adopting Marinari’s separate-disease rule to permit a second action for a distinct maligant disease.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a plaintiff may sue for a second malignant asbestos-related disease if it is separate and distinct from the first and within the statute, and that res judicata does not bar such action.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Marinari permit a second malignant disease action? | Marinari allows separate diseases; two malignant claims are permitted if distinct. | Marinari limits to one nonmalignant and one malignant claim; successive malignant suits are barred. | Yes; Marinari allows a second malignant-disease action if distinct. |
| Is the second action barred by res judicata? | Second action is distinct and not barred by prior settlement or identity of issues. | Second action risks duplicative recovery and privity issues; res judicata should apply. | No; res judicata does not bar the second action when diseases are separate and distinct. |
| What must prove it is a separate and distinct malignant disease? | Second disease must be separate and distinct from the first; burden on plaintiff to prove separation by factors. | Same-category malignancies should be treated restrictively; distinctions may be limited. | Second disease must be separate and distinct with evidence like different mechanisms, tissues, times, symptoms, and outcomes. |
Key Cases Cited
- Marinari v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 612 A.2d 1021 (Pa. 1992) (established separate-disease rule to allow second suit for distinct disease)
- Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 543 Pa. 664 (Pa. 1996) (adopted Marinari framework; allowed separate actions for nonmalignant and malignant diseases)
- McNeil v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 545 Pa. 209 (Pa. 1996) (distinguished separate disease approach in context of multiple actions)
- Abrams v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 602 Pa. 627 (Pa. 2009) (rejected windfall risk damages; clarified separate-disease reasoning)
- Gatling v. Eaton Corp., 807 A.2d 283 (Pa. Super. 2002) (held nonmalignant diseases same category cannot spawn second action; distinguished from distinct malignant diseases)
- Bowe v. Allied, 806 A.2d 435 (Pa. Super. 2002) (limited two-disease rule to nonmalignant vs malignant distinctions)
- Giffear v. Johns-Manville Corp., 682 A.2d 880 (Pa. Super. 1993) (broadened Marinari's recognition of latent asbestos claims while preserving two-disease concept)
- Abrams v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 939 A.2d 388 (Pa.Super. 2007) (addressed latency and limits on risk/fear damages in asbestos cases)