2021 IL App (4th) 200188
Ill. App. Ct.2021Background
- In April 2013 Julie Ann Dale obtained an emergency order of protection against Joseph Bennett after alleging threats, control, and that Bennett admitted hiring someone to murder his business partner; a plenary order was entered in October 2013 expiring October 25, 2015.
- Dale filed pro se in September 2015 to extend the plenary order indefinitely, asserting ongoing fear for her and her children’s safety.
- Bennett was served but did not appear at the November 2015 hearing; the trial court found him in default, vacated a limited-communication modification, and extended the plenary order indefinitely.
- Manatee County (FL) later served Bennett with the extended order.
- In October 2019 Bennett moved to terminate the order, arguing the Act limits plenary orders (including extensions) to two years; the trial court denied the motion in January 2020.
- Bennett appealed, raising three issues: (1) statutory limit to two years bars indefinite extensions, (2) the trial court erred for lack of good-cause findings, and (3) section 220 is unconstitutionally vague.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Dale) | Defendant's Argument (Bennett) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a plenary order may be extended indefinitely | §220(e) allows extensions to remain "until vacated or modified," so extensions can be indefinite | §220(b) says plenary orders valid only for a fixed period not to exceed two years, so extensions must likewise be time-limited | Court: Indefinite extensions are permitted; §220(e)’s specific language controls and is not rendered superfluous |
| Whether the extension was granted without required factual findings / good cause | Dale alleged continuing fear and no material change since the plenary order | Trial court erred because it made insufficient findings and did not require good cause showing | Court: Argument forfeited—Bennett failed to appear and raise the issue below, so cannot raise it on appeal |
| Whether §220 is unconstitutionally vague | Statute gives a reasonable person notice: initial limit two years, extensions may remain until vacated/modified | Statute is internally inconsistent: a plenary order (including an extension) must not exceed two years, creating ambiguity | Court: Statute is not vague; a reasonable person can understand it; statutes are presumed constitutional |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Eppinger, 984 N.E.2d 475 (2013) (apply plain statutory meaning when language is unambiguous)
- People v. Rinehart, 962 N.E.2d 444 (2012) (in pari materia—statutory provisions on same subject construed together)
- Van Dyke v. White, 131 N.E.3d 511 (2019) (specific statutory provisions control over general provisions)
- Bartlow v. Costigan, 13 N.E.3d 1216 (2014) (vagueness challenge framework; burden on challenger)
- Gardner v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 571 N.E.2d 1107 (1991) (forfeiture: issues/evidence not raised in trial court are not considered on appeal)
- Vantage Hospitality Group, Inc. v. Q Ill Dev., LLC, 71 N.E.3d 1 (2016) (forfeiture doctrine applies to late arguments)