Dale Huhmann v. Federal Express Corp.
874 F.3d 1102
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Dale Huhmann, a FedEx pilot and Air Force reservist, was selected for MD-11 first officer (MD-11-FO) training to move from 727 second officer (727-SO) pay grade before being mobilized for active military service in Feb 2003.
- Huhmann was deployed until Aug 31, 2006; FedEx’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was signed Oct 30, 2006, following a Bonus Letter (Aug 26, 2006) that promised signing bonuses based on crew status during the amendable period (June 1, 2004–CBA signing).
- The Bonus Letter treated military leave as active pay status for qualifying and set bonuses: $7,400 for 727-SO and $17,700 for MD-11-FO; it determined bonus grade by the highest crew status held during the amendable period.
- Upon return Dec 1, 2006, Huhmann completed MD-11-FO training and was activated Feb 22, 2007, but FedEx paid him the $7,400 727-SO bonus.
- Huhmann sued under USERRA § 4311(a) claiming FedEx denied him the higher bonus due to military service; district court awarded the MD-11-FO bonus plus fees, applying the "escalator principle" and the "reasonable certainty" test.
- FedEx appealed, arguing (1) RLA arbitration preemption, (2) improper use of reemployment tests under § 4311, (3) erroneous factual finding on reasonable certainty, and (4) § 4316(b)(1) limiting non-seniority benefits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Huhmann) | Defendant's Argument (FedEx) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether RLA arbitration preempts Huhmann’s USERRA claim | USERRA creates an independent statutory right; claim does not require interpreting the CBA | Bonus Letter is part of CBA; dispute is a "minor dispute" for RLA arbitration | Not preempted — USERRA right is independent and resolution doesn’t require CBA interpretation |
| Whether district court could use escalator/reasonable-certainty in § 4311 analysis | These doctrines properly inform whether military service was a substantial factor in denial of an employment benefit | Those doctrines apply only to reemployment claims (§§ 4312–13), not discrimination claims under § 4311 | Permissible — escalator and reasonable-certainty aid the § 4311 burden-shifting analysis to determine the benefit owed |
| Whether Huhmann satisfied the foresight (reasonable certainty) prong | He had been accepted/scheduled for MD-11-FO training before mobilization; strong pilot record and multiple pass opportunities made advancement reasonably certain | Advancement depended on skill and discretionary evaluations, so foresight prong not met | No clear error — district court reasonably found foresight prong satisfied (reasonable, not absolute, certainty) |
| Whether § 4316(b)(1) bars recovery because the signing bonus is non-seniority based | Bonus was at least partly seniority-based (proration by months active during the amendable period) and thus protected; even if not, FedEx’s Bonus Letter treated military time as active so USERRA protections apply | Bonus is determined by crew position/pay grade, not by seniority; § 4316 limits non-seniority benefits to those available to employees on non-military leave | Held for Huhmann — bonus was partly seniority-based and in any event FedEx’s own Bonus Letter credited military service, so § 4316 did not bar the claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Wallace v. City of San Diego, 479 F.3d 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (describes § 4311(a) two-step burden-shifting framework)
- Tilton v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 376 U.S. 169 (1964) (establishes reasonable-certainty foresight/hindsight test for reemployment seniority rights)
- Pomrening v. United Air Lines, Inc., 448 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1971) (applies reasonable-certainty framework to airline training/promotions)
- McKinney v. Mo. Kan. Tex. R.R. Co., 357 U.S. 265 (1958) (promotion dependent on managerial discretion may defeat reasonable-certainty)
- Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581 (1977) (defines seniority-based benefits as those that would have accrued with reasonable certainty and reward length of service)
- Wolfe v. BNSF Ry. Co., 749 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2014) (RLA preemption limited to disputes created or defined by CBA)
- Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246 (1994) (RLA minor/major dispute framework and CBA-dependence test)
- Rivera-Melendez v. Pfizer Pharm., LLC, 730 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2013) (discusses reasonable-certainty and escalator principles under USERRA)
- OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Haas Indus., Inc., 634 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2011) (standard of review for bench trial findings)