Dale Danielson v. Jay Inslee
945 F.3d 1096
| 9th Cir. | 2019Background
- Washington public employees (nonmembers of AFSCME Council 28) were required to pay agency fees under a collective-bargaining agreement, state law, and four decades of Supreme Court precedent (Abood).
- On June 27, 2018 the Supreme Court overruled Abood in Janus, holding mandatory agency fees unconstitutional; the Union immediately stopped collecting fees.
- Plaintiffs filed a putative §1983 class action seeking declaratory/injunctive relief and refunds for pre-Janus agency fees; claims for equitable relief against state officials were rendered moot after Janus.
- The district court granted the Union’s motion, holding the Union could assert a good faith affirmative defense to retrospective monetary liability because it relied on then-binding Supreme Court precedent and presumptively valid state law.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) private defendants may assert a good faith defense under §1983, and (2) the defense bars retrospective monetary relief where the defendant acted in direct reliance on controlling Supreme Court precedent and state law.
- The court rejected limits urged by plaintiffs: it did not require the Union to have anticipated Abood’s overruling, did not limit the defense to particular common-law analogues, and treated plaintiffs’ refund claim as compensatory rather than true restitution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Retroactivity of Janus and remedial consequences | Janus applies retroactively and entitles plaintiffs to refunds of pre-Janus fees | Even if Janus is retroactive, remedy may be limited by defenses | Court assumed retroactivity but declined to equate retroactive right with an automatic retroactive remedy |
| Availability of a good-faith defense to private parties under §1983 | Private parties cannot claim immunity or similar defenses under §1983 | Private parties may assert a good-faith affirmative defense distinct from qualified immunity | Court held private parties can assert a good-faith defense under §1983 (followed Clement) |
| Whether good-faith defense must be limited by closest common-law tort analogy | Good-faith defense should be confined if the analogous 1871 tort allowed it; conversion is closest and provided no good-faith defense | The common-law-analogue rule does not constrain the good-faith defense; abuse-of-process is a better analogue and allowed good faith | Court rejected plaintiff’s reliance on conversion; declined to limit the defense by strict common-law-analogue analysis; found abuse of process a closer analogue that permits good faith |
| Whether good-faith defense bars restitutionary relief (refunds) | Good faith cannot allow a defendant to keep money taken in violation of constitutional rights; restitution must be available | Good faith can bar retrospective monetary liability because the union acted lawfully under then-binding precedent and provided commensurate services | Court treated plaintiffs’ claim as compensatory and held equitable considerations and good-faith defense bar retrospective refunds |
| Whether defendant must prove strict pre-Janus compliance to assert the defense | Union must show it complied with Abood’s constitutional limits to claim good faith | Defense is based on reliance on binding precedent/state law; proof of strict compliance not required here | Court held Union need not prove compliance with pre-Janus constitutional strictures because plaintiffs’ claim alleges reliance on Abood |
Key Cases Cited
- Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (established permissibility of compulsory public-sector agency fees; later overruled by Janus)
- Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (held mandatory agency fees from public employees violate the First Amendment)
- Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31 (Janus II), 942 F.3d 352 (7th Cir. 2019) (held unions may assert good-faith defense to pre-Janus fee refunds)
- Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (discussed distinctions between immunity and other defenses under §1983; reserved on good-faith defense for private parties)
- Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (noted compliance with statute might be asserted as an affirmative defense in §1983 cases)
- Clement v. City of Glendale, 518 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2008) (held private parties may invoke a good-faith defense under §1983)
- Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1983) (held private parties are not entitled to qualified immunity under §1983; distinguished from good-faith defense)
- Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (explained difference between retroactive rights and remedies)
- Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (expressed skepticism about refunding compulsory payments where recipients provided services)
- Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (established judicial duty to declare what the law is)