Dale Allen Wright v. Hon. gates/state, 402 P.3d 1003

In 1992 Dale Allen Wright solicited a woman to allow him to perform sexual acts on her two young children; the woman was an undercover postal inspector and the children were fictitious.
Wright pleaded guilty to two counts of solicitation to commit molestation of a child and received DCAC (Dangerous Crimes Against Children) designations and lifetime probation under then A.R.S. § 13-604.01 (now § 13-705).
One probation revocation (2002) resulted in a 10-year prison term; the other count’s lifetime probation was later reinstated.
In subsequent proceedings (2014–2015) the State sought to revoke probation and Wright repeatedly moved to dismiss the DCAC designation; the trial court denied the motion.
A divided Arizona Court of Appeals panel affirmed that DCAC sentencing can apply when the victim is fictitious; Wright sought and the Arizona Supreme Court granted review focused on whether DCAC enhancements require an actual child victim.
The Supreme Court held that solicitation is a preparatory DCAC offense but that DCAC enhancements require an actual minor under fifteen; it vacated the appellate decision, reversed the trial court’s denial of Wright’s motion to dismiss the DCAC designation, and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether solicitation to commit child molestation qualifies as a second-degree (preparatory) DCAC offense under §13-705(O)	Wright: preparatory should mean only incomplete efforts (e.g., attempt), so solicitation shouldn’t qualify	State: chapter 10 preparatory offenses (attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, facilitation) that involve enumerated DCAC offenses qualify	Held: Solicitation is a preparatory DCAC offense under §13-705(O) referencing chapter 10 offenses (Mejak cited)
Whether DCAC sentencing under §13-705(P)(1) applies when the alleged victim is fictitious	Wright: DCAC requires an actual minor under 15; enhancement inapplicable to fictitious victims	State/Court of Appeals: factual impossibility doctrine and attempt precedent support applying DCAC even if the ‘minor’ was an adult posing as a child	Held: DCAC enhancements apply only when the offense is committed against an actual minor under fifteen; statute’s text, structure, and legislative history require a real child (overruled Carlisle on this point)

State v. Jurden, 239 Ariz. 526 (2016) (standard of review for statutory interpretation)
Mejak v. Granville, 212 Ariz. 555 (2006) (definition and scope of preparatory offenses)
State ex rel. Polk v. Campbell, 239 Ariz. 405 (2016) (statutory context can alter meaning of “minor” in limited circumstances)
State v. Carlisle, 198 Ariz. 203 (App. 2000) (prior appellate decision allowing DCAC enhancement for an adult posing as a minor; overruled here insofar as it held DCAC applies to fictitious victims)
State v. Williams, 175 Ariz. 98 (1993) (distinguishing elements of offenses from statutory conditions for sentencing enhancements)
State v. Miller, 100 Ariz. 288 (1966) (ordinary meaning of statutory words governs interpretation)