Dae Joon Kim v. the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley and John H. Krouse, 13-24-00008-CV

Dae Joon Kim, a tenured associate professor at UTRGV’s School of Medicine, alleged he suffered race, sex, and national origin discrimination and retaliation from UTRGV.
Kim's formal complaint with the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) set the last date of discrimination at May 17, 2021; he filed on November 16, 2021.
Kim claimed he lost research funding and opportunities due to internal complaints and UTRGV’s delayed handling of his grievances.
UTRGV filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing Kim did not timely exhaust his administrative remedies as required by Texas law (must file within 180 days of alleged discrimination).
The trial court granted UTRGV’s plea, and Kim appealed, arguing the continuing violation doctrine applied since his charge indicated ongoing discrimination.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Timeliness of TWC Charge	Kim asserted ongoing (continuing) discriminatory acts within 180 days, as indicated by checking the “continuing action” box.	UTRGV argued no specific discriminatory acts were alleged in the 180-day window; thus, charge was untimely.	The court held the continuing violation doctrine did not apply since no acts were alleged within the 180-day period; charge untimely.
Application of the Continuing Violation Doctrine	Kim claimed the discriminatory acts were part of a continuing violation.	UTRGV argued the doctrine only applies if at least one act falls within the limit, which Kim did not allege.	The court ruled the doctrine was inapplicable, as Kim failed to allege non-time-barred acts.
Scope of Facts in TWC Charge versus Civil Petition	Kim argued the petition referenced acts within 180 days and should count.	UTRGV said only facts included in the TWC charge count for exhaustion.	The court found facts omitted from the charge cannot be considered for jurisdiction/exhaustion.
Trial Court Jurisdiction under TCHRA	Kim maintained the trial court had jurisdiction based on broadly related facts.	UTRGV argued the court lacked jurisdiction due to untimeliness.	The trial court lacked jurisdiction; plea to jurisdiction affirmed.

Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000) (explains the purpose and nature of a plea to the jurisdiction)
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (sets standard for review when subject matter jurisdiction is challenged)
Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. 2018) (discusses standard of review for jurisdictional fact disputes)
Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544 (Tex. 2019) (burden to prove jurisdiction lies on the plaintiff)
Santi v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston, 312 S.W.3d 800 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009) (scope of claims limited to TWC charge and related matters)
Bartosh v. Sam Houston State Univ., 259 S.W.3d 317 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008) (continuing violation doctrine only applies if a non-time-barred act is alleged)
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Davis, 979 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998) (continuing violation expands actionable events only if one is within the statutory period)