Dackman v. Robinson, 211 A.3d 307

Background

Minor Daquantay Robinson alleged lead poisoning from a Baltimore rental; neuropsych testing showed attention/executive deficits and low-average IQ; blood-lead tests in early childhood were elevated.
Respondent designated vocational expert Dr. Estelle L. Davis and economist Dr. Richard Lurito; Davis evaluated records and interviewed family; Lurito quantified lost future earnings relying on Davis’s opinions and census/labor data.
Petitioners moved in limine to exclude Davis (arguing inadequate factual/medical basis) and to exclude Lurito as untimely disclosed; trial court admitted both experts; Petitioners cross‑examined and presented contrary experts.
Jury awarded economic and non‑economic damages; trial court reduced awards for remittitur; Court of Special Appeals affirmed the admissibility rulings.
Court of Appeals granted certiorari to decide (1) whether Davis’s opinions had sufficient factual basis under Md. Rule 5‑702(3) and whether Lewin Realty and Sugarman require use of statistical studies for vocational prognoses, and (2) whether admitting Lurito’s late report was an abuse of discretion.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Robinson)	Defendant's Argument (Dackman)	Held
Admissibility: Was there a sufficient factual basis for the vocational expert to opine about Robinson’s likely education/employment absent deficits?	Dr. Davis performed a detailed, individualized evaluation of records and interviews and is qualified to give vocational‑probability opinions.	Dr. Davis lacked medical/ statistical basis and used no vocational testing; her absent‑deficits opinion was speculative.	Held: Admissible. A detailed individualized assessment plus the expert’s experience can satisfy Rule 5‑702(3).
Whether Lewin Realty and Sugarman require experts to use statistical studies to opine on an individual’s probable education/employment absent impairment	Robinson: Those cases do not impose a requirement that vocational prognoses be based on population studies; quantification of damages (by economists) uses statistics.	Dackman: Those precedents require statistical support for such opinions.	Held: Neither case requires vocational experts to rely on statistical studies for individual attainment opinions; statistics are required for quantifying damages, not for the individualized vocational prognosis.
Timeliness of economic expert disclosure: Was exclusion of Lurito required as a sanction for late report?	Robinson: Lurito was timely designated; report disclosure was not willful and Petitioners had opportunity to depose and cross‑examine; no prejudice shown.	Dackman: Report disclosed after discovery deadline and prejudiced Petitioners who had not designated their own economist.	Held: Admissible. Trial court did not abuse its discretion; factors (reason for delay, prejudice, cure) weighed against exclusion; remedies offered (deposition, designate expert) were adequate.
Due process / scheduling: Did court’s handling of expert deadlines and refusal to postpone trial deny fairness?	Robinson: Court’s actions were reasonable; Petitioners failed to promptly act after receiving reports; no unfair prejudice.	Dackman: Court effectively extended Robinson’s expert deadline but denied Petitioners similar relief, violating fairness.	Held: No due‑process violation; court acted within discretion and fashioned appropriate remedies; no clear abuse.

Key Cases Cited

Sugarman v. Liles, 460 Md. 396 (Md. 2018) (vocational expert’s individualized assessment plus an economist’s statistical quantification can support lost earning‑capacity damages)
Lewin Realty III, Inc. v. Brooks, 138 Md. App. 244 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (discussed sufficiency of vocational expert foundation in lead‑paint case; guidance on individualized evidence)
Lewin Realty III, Inc. v. Brooks, 378 Md. 70 (Md. 2003) (affirmance of Lewin Realty decision on other issues)
Levitas v. Christian, 454 Md. 233 (Md. 2017) (standard of review: trial court has broad discretion over expert admissibility under Md. Rule 5‑702)