Da Graca v. Garland, 23 F.4th 106

Background:

Petitioner Aires Daniel Benros Da Graca, a lawful permanent resident since 1989, was convicted in Rhode Island (2016) under RIGL § 31-9-1 for driving a vehicle without the owner’s consent (felony sentence suspended; probation).
DHS initiated removal proceedings charging an aggravated-felony “theft offense” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) based on the RIGL § 31-9-1 conviction.
The Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals concluded the Rhode Island statute was categorically a theft offense, relying on the BIA’s Matter of V‑Z‑S definition that temporary deprivations may qualify as theft (except de minimis takings).
The Board required Da Graca to point to Rhode Island decisions showing the statute was applied to de minimis takings and distinguished Castillo (4th Cir.) where a near-identical Virginia statute was held not categorical.
The First Circuit reviewed de novo whether RIGL § 31-9-1 matches the generic federal theft definition, examined Rhode Island statutory context and precedent, and considered whether an actual-case requirement applies to show overbreadth.
The court held RIGL § 31-9-1 is overbroad because it encompasses de minimis conduct (e.g., joyriding), rejected an actual-case requirement, vacated the BIA decision, and remanded for further proceedings.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether RIGL § 31-9-1 is categorically an aggravated‑felony "theft offense"	§ 31-9-1 covers temporary/de minimis takings (joyriding) so it is overbroad and not a categorical match	The statute involves intent to deprive and Board precedent treats temporary deprivation as theft; no RI cases show de minimis prosecutions	Court: § 31-9-1 is overbroad (includes joyriding); not a categorical theft offense
Whether petitioner must identify actual state prosecutions to show overbreadth	No; if a statute is plainly overbroad, no actual‑case proof is required	BIA required petitioner to cite actual RI cases applying the statute to de minimis takings	Court: rejects an actual‑case requirement where statute is plainly overbroad; realistic‑probability satisfied by text and context
Whether Rhode Island statutory context narrows § 31-9-1 (e.g., separate joyriding statute)	No relevant RI provision narrows § 31-9-1; earlier RI authority described the statute as "joyriding"	Board argued absence of explicit text excluding de minimis takings is insufficient without state case law showing narrow application	Court: no contextual narrowing exists; lack of a separate joyriding statute and Rhode Island precedent indicate § 31-9-1 covers de minimis takings
Standard of review for state‑law interpretation relied on by BIA	State‑law issues are for courts to decide; no deference to BIA on state law	BIA’s interpretation informed its removal decision	Court: reviews state‑law interpretation de novo and did not defer to the BIA on Rhode Island law

Key Cases Cited

Gonzales v. Duenas‑Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (realistic‑probability test for statutory overbreadth)
Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798 (court may find a statute overbroad based on text alone)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (textual categorical‑approach principles)
Swaby v. Yates, 847 F.3d 62 (no actual‑case requirement when statute is plainly overbroad)
United States v. Burghardt, 939 F.3d 397 (consider statutory structure for narrowing interpretation)
Castillo v. Holder, 776 F.3d 262 (Fourth Circuit: similar statute did not categorically match theft)
Perry v. Rent‑a‑Ride, Inc., 505 A.2d 424 (R.I. Supreme Court referred to prior § 31‑9‑1 conviction as "joyriding")
Lecky v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1 (deference principles for BIA where applicable)
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (foundational categorical‑approach rule)
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (facts underlying conviction irrelevant under categorical approach)