D.W. v. A.G.
926 N.W.2d 651
| Neb. | 2019Background
- D.W. filed an ex parte petition and affidavit seeking a sexual assault protection order alleging A.G. sexually penetrated her while she was incapacitated after drinking.
- The county court issued an ex parte sexual assault protection order; A.G. requested a show cause hearing and denied the allegations.
- At the show cause hearing both parties testified; testimony conflicted about D.W.’s level of intoxication and whether she consented. Photographs and an acquaintance’s testimony were admitted; the original petition and affidavit were not offered into evidence.
- After the close of evidence the trial court stated it would not continue the sexual assault protection order but would enter some other protection order; it did not give notice of the new theory to A.G. at the hearing.
- The judge sua sponte refiled D.W.’s petition under a new case number and, two days later, entered a harassment protection order with terms like the prior ex parte order; the original case’s sexual assault order was then dismissed.
- A.G. appealed the harassment protection order and the sufficiency finding; D.W. cross-appealed the dismissal of the sexual assault protection order.
Issues
| Issue | D.W.'s Argument | A.G.'s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject-matter jurisdiction to enter a harassment protection order | Court had authority to issue protection orders generally | Trial court lacked jurisdiction because D.W. sought a sexual assault order, not harassment | Court: No jurisdictional defect; trial court had power to hear harassment matters |
| Procedural due process in entering harassment order | Harassment order appropriate based on evidence; no prejudice | Trial court violated due process by imposing a new theory after close of evidence and without notice | Court: Reversed harassment order; entry violated procedural due process and must be vacated |
| Sufficiency of evidence to support sexual assault protection order | Evidence supported sexual assault or incapacity (D.W.'s memory gap, inability to recall consent) | Evidence was conflicting; testimony showed D.W. appeared coherent and consenting | Court: Affirmed dismissal of sexual assault order (no plain error) because credibility conflicts justified judge’s decision |
| Trial court advocacy/impartiality (judge acting on own initiative) | N/A (court could identify appropriate relief) | Judge improperly imposed a different theory and acted beyond neutral role | Court criticized sua sponte approach; the due process ruling disposes of the result though impartiality concerns noted |
Key Cases Cited
- Mahmood v. Mahmud, 279 Neb. 390, 778 N.W.2d 426 (2010) (protection orders are analogous to injunctions; limited due process required in harassment hearings)
- Linda N. v. William N., 289 Neb. 607, 856 N.W.2d 436 (2014) (petitioner may change theory before court makes final decision; late changes raise due process concerns)
- Maria A. on behalf of Leslie G. v. Oscar G., 301 Neb. 673, 919 N.W.2d 841 (2018) (appellate court gives weight to trial judge credibility findings when evidence conflicts)
- Sherman v. Sherman, 18 Neb. App. 342, 781 N.W.2d 615 (Neb. Ct. App. 2010) (trial judge should explain both theories and allow petitioner to elect; judge must avoid choosing theory for petitioner)
- Zahl v. Zahl, 273 Neb. 1043, 736 N.W.2d 365 (2007) (procedural due process requires fundamental fairness: notice and opportunity to be heard)
- Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (essential due process requirements are notice and an opportunity to respond)
- Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (due process requires notice before rights are affected)
- Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223 (1863) (early articulation that parties must be notified to be heard)
