942 F.3d 324
6th Cir.2019Background
- D.T., a child with autism, was withdrawn from Tennessee public school by his parents and placed in private therapy after public schooling proved inadequate; the parents were convicted of truancy as a result.
- To avoid further prosecution while preserving therapy, the parents enrolled D.T. in a state-approved private school and private therapy program, but they want the option to remove him again if needed.
- Parents sued the school district seeking a preliminary injunction to preclude future truancy prosecution, arguing federal disability law preempts state attendance laws.
- The district court denied the preliminary injunction solely because the parents failed to show an imminent, irreparable injury, and it declined to reach the other three preliminary-injunction factors.
- Parents appealed, arguing the court should have considered the other factors and that the threat of future prosecution was sufficiently concrete to justify immediate relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of preliminary injunction was an abuse of discretion | Parents: imminent threat of prosecution creates irreparable harm warranting injunction | School district: threat is speculative; no immediate irreparable harm | No abuse; denial affirmed because plaintiffs failed to show imminent irreparable harm |
| Whether court erred by stopping after finding no irreparable harm | Parents: court should balance all four factors before denying relief | School district: irreparable-harm requirement is dispositive; court may stop | Court correctly stopped; irreparable harm is mandatory prerequisite |
| Whether fear of future prosecution based on possible future choices is a "certain and immediate" injury | Parents: credible threat of prosecution (citing Kiser) establishes injury in fact | School district: multiple contingent events make the harm speculative | Harm is speculative (too many "ifs"); not certain and immediate enough for injunction |
| Whether likelihood of success on the merits can substitute for irreparable harm | Parents: likely to win on merits supports granting injunction now | School district: likelihood alone cannot replace irreparable-harm requirement | Likelihood of success does not obviate the need to show imminent irreparable harm |
Key Cases Cited
- Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018) (preliminary injunction requires a showing of likely success and likely irreparable harm)
- Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Mich. Brick, Inc., 679 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1982) (irreparable injury is an indispensable prerequisite for a preliminary injunction)
- Griepentrog v. Mich. Coal. of Radioactive Material Users, Inc., 945 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1991) (injury must be certain and immediate, not speculative)
- Kiser v. Reitz, 765 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2014) (credible threat of prosecution can support standing where future exposure is imminent and noncontingent)
- Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (articulates the four-part preliminary injunction test and emphasizes the need for likely irreparable harm)
- S. Milk Sales, Inc. v. Martin, 924 F.2d 98 (6th Cir. 1991) (district court may deny a preliminary injunction based solely on lack of irreparable injury)
- NHL Players' Ass'n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 325 F.3d 712 (6th Cir. 2003) (standard of review for denial of preliminary injunction is abuse of discretion)
