D. Steilman v. Michael
2017 MT 310
| Mont. | 2017Background
- In 1996, Derrick Steilman (age 17 years, 323 days) killed Paul Bischke; he later killed Jack Davis (as an adult) in Washington.
- Steilman pleaded guilty in Montana to deliberate homicide; on Oct. 15, 1999 the District Court sentenced him to 100 years for homicide plus 10 years for weapon use, ordered no parole, and ran the Montana term concurrent with a 23-year, 8-month Washington sentence.
- Montana law made Steilman eligible for day-for-day good-time credit (potentially halving the Montana term to 55 years); concurrent Washington credit and Washington’s community-release rules could further reduce time attributable to the Montana conviction.
- Steilman sought a writ of habeas corpus arguing his juvenile status required the sentencing court to consider youth characteristics under Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana, and that his 110‑year parole‑ineligible term was a de facto life sentence.
- The Montana Supreme Court held Miller/Montgomery apply to discretionary sentencing and to de facto life terms, but concluded Steilman’s sentence was not a de facto life term when factoring good‑time credit and the concurrent Washington sentence; it denied the petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Miller and Montgomery apply to Montana’s discretionary sentencing scheme | Steilman: Miller/Montgomery require courts to consider youth characteristics before imposing life without parole even under discretionary schemes | State: Miller limited to mandatory LWOP schemes; discretionary Montana scheme does not create facial invalidity | Court: Miller/Montgomery apply to discretionary sentencing — sentencers must consider youth characteristics when imposing LWOP or its practical equivalent |
| Whether Steilman’s 110‑year, no‑parole term is a de facto life sentence triggering Miller protections | Steilman: 110 years without parole is the practical equivalent of life and thus Miller applies | State: Term‑of‑years is distinct from life; good‑time and other mechanics prevent it from being de facto life | Court: Although term‑of‑years can be a de facto LWOP, Steilman’s sentence — when accounting for day‑for‑day good time and the concurrent Washington sentence — does not amount to de facto life here; petition denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (Miller requires sentencers to consider youth characteristics before imposing life without parole)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (Miller announced a substantive rule with retroactive effect; juvenile LWOP disfavored except for the rare irreparably corrupt)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (juveniles are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing; death penalty unconstitutional for juveniles)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (life without parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders categorically barred)
- McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908 (7th Cir.: Miller’s youth‑consideration principle applies to discretionary life sentences)