D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14901

D.S., a student in East Porter County School Corp., alleges repeated bullying by classmates from 3rd through 8th grade, including physical incidents and written threats. She stopped attending Morgan Township Middle/High School after a February 9, 2011 incident involving taunting at a post-practice locker change.
D.S. reported incidents to school staff; she observed the guidance counselor and principal speak to alleged bullies on a limited number of occasions but had no complete record of disciplinary action.
D.S. contends some school staff were complicit (e.g., a teacher laughed when classmates moved her desk; coaches limited playing time; a gym teacher required activity while injured).
After D.S.’s parents confronted school personnel on Feb. 9, the superintendent banned the parents from East Porter property for one year; D.S. voluntarily did not return.
D.S.’s parents attempted to transfer her to neighboring Porter Township School Corp. (Boone Grove Middle); the transfer was denied (enrollment closed), and the family disputes communications about open enrollment.
Plaintiffs sued East Porter and PTSC under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging due process (state-created danger), equal protection (class-of-one), and Monell municipal-liability claims; district court granted summary judgment for defendants and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether East Porter violated due process via the state-created danger doctrine	East Porter’s affirmative acts/inaction created or increased D.S.’s risk of student-on-student bullying	Schools have no general affirmative duty to protect from private violence; the record lacks evidence that officials created/increased the danger or that conduct shocks the conscience	No — summary judgment affirmed; plaintiff failed to show creation/increase of danger or conscience-shocking conduct
Whether PTSC violated equal protection under a class-of-one theory when it denied transfer enrollment	PTSC treated D.S. differently from similarly situated applicants without a rational basis (evidence: inconsistent statements about open enrollment)	No proof of any similarly situated comparator treated differently; plaintiff failed to respond to summary-judgment motion below	No — summary judgment affirmed; no similarly situated comparator shown
Whether Monell municipal liability exists against East Porter or PTSC	Municipal policies/customs caused constitutional violations against D.S.	A municipality cannot be liable under Monell absent an underlying constitutional violation by employees	No — affirmed because no underlying constitutional violation was established

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (Due Process does not generally impose an affirmative duty to protect individuals from private actors)
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (Municipal liability under § 1983 requires an execution of a policy or custom causing the injury)
Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1993) (articulating state-created danger theory elements)
King ex rel. King v. East St. Louis Sch. Dist. 189, 496 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2007) (state-created danger standard articulated for school context)
Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (‘shocks the conscience’ standard for state conduct)
Jackson v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. 204, 653 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2011) (school-official conduct and state-created danger analysis)
Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (class-of-one equal protection standard)
Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996) (discriminatory purpose requirement for § 1983 equal protection claims)
Buchanan-Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2009) (§ 1983 elements reminder)
McDonald v. Vill. of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992 (7th Cir. 2004) (summary judgment appropriate where no reasonable jury could find comparators similarly situated)
Sallenger v. City of Springfield, Ill., 630 F.3d 499 (7th Cir. 2010) (Monell requires underlying employee constitutional violation)