151 N.E.3d 1210
Ind.2020Background
- The State filed juvenile delinquency petitions against D.P. and N.B. after each was over 21 (D.P. was 23 when filed; N.B. was 21), alleging they committed acts that would be felony child molesting when they were under 18.
- The State moved to waive both individuals from juvenile court to adult criminal court (D.P. under the presumptive-waiver statute; N.B. under the mandatory-waiver statute, based on a prior felony conviction).
- D.P. moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the juvenile court denied dismissal and the Court of Appeals affirmed; D.P. sought transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court.
- N.B. moved to dismiss; the juvenile court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals reversed, and N.B. sought transfer; the Supreme Court consolidated the appeals.
- The key legal question was whether a juvenile court may conduct a waiver hearing to transfer to adult criminal court an alleged offender who is 21 or older at the time the delinquency petition is filed but who allegedly committed the offense while under 18.
- The Indiana Supreme Court held the juvenile court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to waive such individuals because the statutory definition of "child" excludes persons aged 21 or older at the time of filing; it reversed in D.P. and affirmed dismissal in N.B.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a juvenile court has subject matter jurisdiction to hold a waiver hearing and waive to adult court an alleged offender who is 21 or older at time of filing but committed the alleged offense under 18 | State: Juvenile courts have limited power to decide waiver even when they lack authority to adjudicate delinquency; otherwise child-molesting prosecutions could be time-barred | D.P./N.B.: If not a "child" under the definition, the juvenile court lacks all subject matter jurisdiction over the delinquency proceeding, including waiver | Court: Juvenile court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to conduct waiver because the jurisdiction and waiver statutes apply only when the alleged offender is a "child," and the statutory definition excludes persons 21 or older |
Key Cases Cited
- Twyman v. State, 459 N.E.2d 705 (Ind. 1984) (age of offender determines juvenile-court subject matter jurisdiction)
- M.C. v. State, 127 N.E.3d 1178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate 23-year-old for acts committed under 18)
- D.P. v. State, 136 N.E.3d 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (Court of Appeals held juvenile court could hear waiver motion)
- State v. N.B., 139 N.E.3d 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (Court of Appeals held juvenile court had jurisdiction to entertain waiver)
- State v. Reinhart, 112 N.E.3d 705 (Ind. 2018) (explaining subject matter jurisdiction principles)
- State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs v. Ispat Inland, Inc., 784 N.E.2d 477 (Ind. 2003) (judgment entered without subject matter jurisdiction is void)
- Jackson v. State, 50 N.E.3d 767 (Ind. 2016) (statutory interpretation principles: give effect to clear statutory language)
- Calvin v. State, 87 N.E.3d 474 (Ind. 2017) (courts must not rewrite unambiguous statutes; separation-of-powers caution)
