D.P. v. G.J.P.
146 A.3d 204
| Pa. | 2016Background
- Parents married in 2006, separated in Oct. 2012, never sought divorce or a custody order; they agreed to cut off children’s contact with paternal grandparents.
- Grandparents filed for partial physical custody in Oct. 2014 relying on 23 Pa.C.S. § 5325(2), which grants grandparent standing when parents "have been separated for a period of at least six months or have commenced and continued a proceeding to dissolve their marriage."
- Trial court dismissed the grandparents’ complaint, holding the separation-based half of § 5325(2) unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment (strict scrutiny).
- Commonwealth Court transferred the appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which considered whether conferring standing based solely on a six-month parental separation infringes parents’ fundamental liberty interests.
- The Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny, concluded the six-month separation criterion is not narrowly tailored to the compelling state interest in protecting children, severed the separation clause, and affirmed dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Grandparents' Argument | Parents' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 5325(2)’s six-month separation basis for grandparent standing infringes parental fundamental rights | Separation-based standing is narrowly tailored to protect children and promote beneficial grandparent ties | Separation alone does not indicate parental unfitness; presumption that fit parents act in children’s best interests bars such intrusion | The separation-only basis is not narrowly tailored; it violates due process and is severed from the statute |
| Whether state interest in child welfare justifies separation-based standing | State has a compelling parens patriae interest in preserving grandparent-grandchild relationships that supports the statute | The state interest is insufficiently implicated by mere separation absent evidence of harm | The interest is compelling generally, but separation alone is an inadequate proxy for harm, so it does not justify this intrusion |
| Whether prior precedent (Hiller/Schmehl) controls | Hiller/Schmehl support limited grandparent standing and distinguishable facts; statute is consistent with those decisions | Schmehl supports upholding similar language; but facts here (no dispute between parents) differ from Schmehl | Hiller and Schmehl inform the analysis but do not require upholding the separation clause; the Court distinguishes Schmehl and upholds other standing bases |
| Remedy: severance vs. wholesale invalidation of § 5325(2) | Limit invalidation to the separation clause; preserve other standing grounds (death, dissolution proceedings, residence-based clause) | (Parents) sought dismissal of complaint; did not seek broader invalidation beyond separation clause | Court severed the "separated for at least six months" language, leaving other bases intact; affirmed dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (parental right to make decisions for children is a fundamental liberty interest; third-party visitation statutes are subject to constitutional limits)
- Hiller v. Fausey, 588 Pa. 342, 904 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2006) (upholding narrow grandparent standing when a parent is deceased and emphasizing presumption in favor of fit parents)
- Schmehl v. Wegelin, 592 Pa. 581, 927 A.2d 183 (Pa. 2007) (upholding grandparent standing in dissolution/divorce contexts and addressing overlap of due process/equal protection analyses)
- Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (recognizing parental due process rights regarding custody and care decisions)
- Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006) (remedy principle: limit judicial invalidation to the unconstitutional reach of a statute when severance is feasible)