D.P. v. G.J.P.
146 A.3d 204
Pa.2016Background
- Parents married in 2006, separated in Oct. 2012, have three minor children and never obtained a custody order; they agreed to cut off contact between the children and paternal grandparents.
- Grandparents filed for partial physical custody under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5325(2), which grants standing to grandparents where parents have been separated at least six months or have commenced dissolution proceedings.
- The trial court granted parents’ motion to dismiss, holding the “separated six months” basis for grandparent standing violated parents’ Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights.
- Commonwealth Supreme Court review focused on whether conferring standing based solely on six months’ separation is narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest (strict scrutiny), given parents’ fundamental right to direct care, custody, and control of their children.
- The Court held the six‑month separation clause is not narrowly tailored and severed that phrase from § 5325(2), leaving standing for grandparents where parents have commenced and continued a dissolution proceeding (and leaving §§ 5325(1) and (3) intact).
Issues
| Issue | Grandparents' Argument | Parents' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 5325(2)’s grant of standing based solely on six months’ parental separation infringes parental liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment | Statute is narrowly tailored to compelling interest in protecting children and preserving grandparent relationships; distinguishes Troxel because standing is limited to grandparents and to separation/divorce contexts | Separation alone does not indicate parental unfitness; allowing standing despite parents’ agreement unduly burdens fundamental parental rights | Six‑month separation as an independent basis for standing is not narrowly tailored and violates due process; that language severed from § 5325(2) |
| Whether strict scrutiny applies | Acknowledged parents’ rights but argued statute meets narrow tailoring | Parents: fundamental rights triggered, strict scrutiny required and statute fails it | Court applied strict scrutiny and found the separation‑only provision overbroad |
| Whether prior precedent (Hiller/Schmehl) controls | Relied on Hiller and Schmehl to defend grandparent standing schemes | Distinguish Hiller (death of a parent) and Schmehl (divorce, court involvement) as factually different | Court treated Hiller and Schmehl as relevant but not controlling; distinguished on facts and preserved other standing provisions |
| Remedy/severability: extent of invalidation | Grandparents urged preservation of most of § 5325 | Parents urged dismissal of complaint; some justices urged broader invalidation | Court severed only the six‑month separation text, leaving the dissolution prong and other subsections intact |
Key Cases Cited
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (parents have a fundamental liberty interest in childrearing; third‑party visitation statutes limited by Due Process)
- Hiller v. Fausey, 588 Pa. 342, 904 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2006) (upheld narrow grandparent standing when a parent is deceased and emphasized presumption in favor of fit parents)
- Schmehl v. Wegelin, 592 Pa. 581, 927 A.2d 183 (Pa. 2007) (upheld predecessor statute granting standing in dissolution/divorce contexts; discussed overlap of due‑process and equal‑protection analyses)