D.O. v. Escondido Union School Dist., 19-56043

D.O. alleged Escondido Union School District violated the IDEA by waiting ~4 months to assess him for autism after referral, violating federal and California timelines for assessment.
D.O. filed before the California Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH); an ALJ originally dismissed his claims. He then appealed to federal district court.
The district court granted summary judgment to D.O. on the timely-assessment issue (Dec. 18, 2018) and remanded the case to OAH without further instruction, staying additional district-court proceedings.
On remand the OAH ALJ held an evidentiary hearing limited to remedy and ordered only reimbursement to D.O.; neither party returned to the district court to obtain a final judgment.
The District appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing the district-court remand became a final, appealable order after the OAH decision; D.O. moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit held it lacked appellate jurisdiction because the December 2018 remand order was not a final judgment and the OAH decision did not convert it into one; the appeal was dismissed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Dec. 18, 2018 remand order was a final, appealable judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291	D.O.: remand was not final; appellate court lacks jurisdiction	District: OAH's subsequent remedial decision made the remand effectively final and appealable	Not final; appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
Whether a remand limited to remedy is ministerial (and thus a final disposition)	D.O.: remedy determination in IDEA is fact-specific, not ministerial	District: ALJ limited proceedings to remedy, so remand was effectively ministerial	Remedy determinations are not ministerial; remand is not a final disposition
Whether the collateral-order doctrine required an immediate appeal (foreclosing later appeal)	D.O.: appeal should be dismissed for lack of finality	District: could immediately appeal under collateral-order doctrine after OAH action	Collateral-order doctrine is permissive, not mandatory; District could await a later final judgment and still appeal

Chugach Alaska Corp. v. Lujan, 915 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1990) (final-judgment rule and collateral-order exception framework)
Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 152 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1998) (remand to hearing officer in IDEA case is not appealable as final)
Pauly v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 348 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2003) (ministerial remand may be treated as final in limited circumstances)
Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359 (1985) (IDEA remedy determinations require fact-specific inquiry)
Alsea Valley All. v. Dep't of Com., 358 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2004) (all three Chugach criteria must be met for immediate appeal of remand)
Legal Voice v. Stormans Inc., 738 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2013) (collateral-order doctrine creates an opportunity, not a trap; parties need not appeal immediately)
Hook v. Ariz. Dep't of Corr., 107 F.3d 1397 (9th Cir. 1997) (same principle that immediate appeal under collateral-order is optional)