D.M.T. v. T.M.H.
129 So. 3d 320
| Fla. | 2013Background
- D.M.T. and T.M.H. were in a long-term relationship and planned to raise a child together as equal parental partners.
- Egg donated by T.M.H. and birth by D.M.T. resulted in a child born January 4, 2004, with both women participating in parenting.
- The couple separated in 2006; the child initially lived with D.M.T., while T.M.H. began and then paused child-support arrangements and shared costs.
- Florida Statutes 742.13–742.14 govern the relinquishment of parental rights by egg/sperm donors; the Fifth District held 742.14 unconstitutional as applied to T.M.H.
- T.M.H. sought to establish parental rights and declaratory relief; the trial court granted summary judgment against her based on the statute.
- The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth District, held 742.14 unconstitutional as applied, and remanded to determine best interests and time-sharing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 742.14 is unconstitutional as applied to deprive T.M.H. of due process/privacy rights | T.M.H. has a protected parental interest arising from biology and long-term parenting. | Statute serves a compelling interest in protecting parental rights of birth mother and other regular donors; waiver language may negate rights. | Unconstitutional as applied; violates due process and privacy. |
| Whether 742.14, with 742.18(2), discriminates based on sexual orientation in violation of equal protection | Same-sex couples are treated worse than heterosexuals in relinquishment of rights. | Classification is rationally related to legitimate state interests in stability and certainty in assisted reproduction. | Unconstitutional as applied; violates equal protection. |
| Whether T.M.H. has a constitutionally protected right to be a parent based on biological connection and assumed responsibilities | Biological connection plus assumed parental responsibilities creates a fundamental right to be a parent. | Biological connection alone or waiver arguments do not grant a protected parental right under the statutes. | Fundamental right to be a parent recognized. |
| Whether the definition of 'commissioning couple' improperly excludes same-sex couples | Excluding same-sex couples lacks rational basis and undermines equal protection. | Statutory framework aims at certainty; intent of donors and commissioning couples is adequately addressed. | Statute unconstitutional as applied; same-sex couples must be treated equivalently. |
| Whether the signed informed-consent waivers by T.M.H. properly relinquished parental rights | Waiver forms demonstrate intent to co-parent and should bar removal of parental rights. | Waivers were not applicable to an egg donor in this context; not binding to relinquish parental rights when co-parenting. | Waivers ineffective; do not bar parental rights. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (U.S. 1983) (biological connection can develop into a fundamental right to be a parent)
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (U.S. 2000) (parents have a fundamental liberty interest in care, custody, and control of their children)
- Baby E.A.W., 658 So.2d 961 (Fla. 1995) (biological father’s inchoate rights may become protected upon commitment to parenting)
- Lamaritata v. Lucas, 823 So.2d 316 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (sperm donor’s rights depend on contractual intent; nonparent status if no joint parenting)
- Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (nonparent cannot be granted visitation against legal parent)
- Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So.3d 79 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (equal protection challenges to same-sex adoption prohibitions; rational basis not necessarily required)
- In re Sebastian, 25 Misc.3d 567 (N.Y. Sur. 2009) (recognizes importance of parental rights of biological parents in assisted reproduction)
