983 F. Supp. 2d 138
D.D.C.2013Background
- D.K., a minor with multiple disabilities, was unilaterally placed by his parents at McLean School (a general-education private school that does not implement IEPs) from 2006; a 2007 hearing officer ordered the District to fund that placement.
- By 2012 DCPS convened a new IEP showing full-time specialized instruction outside general education and proposed transferring D.K. to Kingsbury Day School (a special-education private school with a Certificate of Approval that implements IEPs).
- Plaintiffs refused Kingsbury, kept D.K. at McLean, and requested a due process hearing claiming the transfer changed his educational placement and that Kingsbury was more restrictive/less rigorous.
- The hearing officer found Kingsbury could implement the IEP, McLean would not/could not implement the IEP and lacked a Certificate of Approval, and the transfer was a change of location—not a change in "educational placement."
- The district court reviewed the administrative record on summary judgment, concluded the Hearing Officer was correct (District offered a FAPE at Kingsbury), denied plaintiffs’ relief, and entered judgment for the District.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether transfer from McLean to Kingsbury constitutes a change in "educational placement" under IDEA | The specific school/location (McLean) is essential to D.K.’s program because it offers mainstream contact and rigor; moving to Kingsbury materially changes placement | "Educational placement" denotes the educational program/services in the IEP, not the physical school; services remain the same under the IEP so the move is location-only | Transfer was a change of location only, not a change in educational placement; no fundamental change or elimination of basic program elements |
| Whether DCPS must continue funding McLean despite McLean not implementing IEPs or holding required approval | Plaintiffs sought continued funding and placement at McLean | District argued it cannot place a student where the IEP cannot be implemented or the school lacks a Certificate of Approval; it offered Kingsbury as an appropriate FAPE | District may not be required (and here could not) to place/fund McLean because McLean does not/will not implement the IEP and lacks a Certificate of Approval; Kingsbury is a proper placement |
| Whether proposed Kingsbury placement violates Least Restrictive Environment (LRE) requirement | Plaintiffs asserted Kingsbury is more restrictive (self-contained, all disabled peers) and thus violates LRE | District noted IEP itself requires full-time instruction outside general education, so LRE as drafted permits placement in a non-general-education setting | No LRE violation: placement at Kingsbury conforms to D.K.’s IEP which requires instruction outside general education |
| Whether the hearing officer erred by not requiring additional/transition services for anxiety-related transition issues | Plaintiffs argued transition supports were needed to implement placement | District and Kingsbury witnesses presented plans and outreach to facilitate transition; monitoring staff attempted contact | Court found the record showed appropriate transition efforts and the hearing officer considered them; no reversible error |
Key Cases Cited
- Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982) (IDEA requires a FAPE, not any particular educational outcome)
- Lunceford v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 1577 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (no change in educational placement absent a fundamental change/elimination of basic program elements)
- White v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 343 F.3d 373 (5th Cir. 2003) ("educational placement" means the educational program, not the physical institution)
- T.Y. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 2009) (educational placement refers to classes/services, not "bricks and mortar")
- A.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 372 F.3d 674 (4th Cir. 2004) (educational placement focuses on program/environment rather than location)
- Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (burden on party challenging administrative determination; court gives due weight to hearing officer)