D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School District 60, 647 F.3d 754

D.J.M., a high school student in Hannibal Public School District #60, sent instant messages mentioning guns to a classmate; messages were relayed to a trusted adult and the principal.
School authorities notified police after receiving forwarded messages; D.J.M. was escorted by police, placed in juvenile detention, and later evaluated psychiatrically.
D.J.M. was suspended for ten days, then for the remainder of the school year due to disruption and threats as found by the school board.
Parents challenged the suspension under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming First Amendment rights were violated; district court granted summary judgment for the District on the § 1983 claim and remanded state administrative review.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, addressing whether the speech was a true threat, whether disruption justified discipline, and the propriety of remand for state-law administrative review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether D.J.M.'s messages were true threats	Doe controls; messages not serious threats	Messages constituted true threats requiring school action	Yes; messages were true threats and not protected
Whether the District could discipline for out-of-school cyber speech	First Amendment protects student cyberspeech off-campus	Disruptive and threatening speech may be disciplined	District permitted to discipline due to true-threat finding and disruption
Whether the district court properly remanded the state-law administrative-review claim	Remand was improper and moot after diploma	Remand appropriate; records remain subject to disclosure in certain contexts	Remand not an abuse of discretion; not moot due to potential continued disclosures
Whether the district court erred by not requiring a different First Amendment standard (Tinker) over true-threat analysis	Tinker-based disruption standard should govern	True-threat framework is controlling; disruption supports action too	Court used true-threat and disruption analyses; both support district action

Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002) (defines true threats and intent-to-communicate requirement)
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (First Amendment allows regulation only where substantial disruption is forecast)
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (schools may discipline lewd or disruptive speech not protected by First Amendment)
Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (schools may regulate school-sponsored speech to protect privacy and order)
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (schools may restrict speech promoting illegal drug use and maintain safe environment)
Wisniewski v. Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007) (out-of-school cyberspeech may be subject to school discipline if reasonably foreseeable to disrupt)
Riehm v. Engelking, 538 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2008) (graphic threat in essay confirmed as true threat; unprotected)
Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004) (distinguishes intentional communication from non-communicated imply threats)