D.G. Ex Rel. LaNisha T. v. New Caney Independent School District
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19625
| 5th Cir. | 2015Background
- D.G., a 13-year-old special-education student, prevailed at an administrative due-process hearing against New Caney ISD (NCISD), which found the district had improperly isolated and restrained him and ordered remedial relief; the district did not seek judicial review.
- The hearing officer had no authority to award attorneys’ fees; the IDEA authorizes prevailing parents to seek fees in court under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
- Congress added a 90-day filing limit in 2004 at § 1415(i)(2)(B) for bringing a civil action “from the date of the decision of the hearing officer,” or a state’s explicit time limit if provided.
- D.G. filed suit for attorneys’ fees 120 days after the hearing decision; NCISD moved for summary judgment arguing the suit was time-barred under § 1415(i)(2)(B).
- The district court dismissed D.G.’s complaint; the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding § 1415(i)(2)(B) governs appeals by parties aggrieved by administrative decisions, not separate fee actions by prevailing parties.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1415(i)(2)(B)’s 90-day limit applies to standalone suits for IDEA attorneys’ fees | § 1415(i)(2)(B) does not apply to fee actions; fees actions arise under § 1415(i)(3) and lack an express IDEA limitations period | The 90-day limit applies to any “action” under § 1415, including fee-only suits, so D.G.’s suit (filed after 90 days) is time-barred | The 90-day limit in § 1415(i)(2)(B) applies only to actions seeking judicial review by parties “aggrieved” by administrative decisions; it does not apply to fee suits by prevailing parties |
| If § 1415(i)(2)(B) does not apply, what limitations period governs an IDEA fee action? | Borrow a multi-year state statutory period (e.g., Texas tort/other longer limits) or federal default (28 U.S.C. § 1658) | Borrow the short administrative appeal period (e.g., Texas 30-day APA period) as most analogous | Court need not decide which period to borrow; it rejected application of § 1415(i)(2)(B) and held the limitations period for a fee action does not begin to run until the time to appeal the administrative decision expires |
| When does the limitations period for a fees action begin to run? | Begins after the aggrieved party’s time to seek judicial review of the hearing decision expires (so prevailing parties need not file prematurely) | Begins on the date of the hearing officer’s decision (so prevailing parties must sue within 90 days) | The limitations period does not start until the deadline for seeking review of the administrative decision has passed; under the facts, D.G.’s filing (120 days after decision) was timely |
| Standing to seek fees when represented by publicly funded counsel | Parent/prevailing party has Article III standing to seek fees even if counsel is publicly funded and the client paid nothing | District argued lack of redressable injury because plaintiff didn’t pay fees and counsel was publicly funded | Court held plaintiff has standing; precedent allows fee awards to publicly funded legal services and recovery when client didn’t directly pay fees |
Key Cases Cited
- Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (IDEA’s purpose and framework)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing requirements)
- Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991) (borrowing state limitations for federal claims absent express period)
- Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319 (1989) (federal borrowing rules and when federal law supplies the analogy)
- Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004) (28 U.S.C. § 1658 default limitations for new federal causes of action)
- Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (“prevailing party” requires judicial imprimatur)
- Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) (standards for reasonable attorney’s fees)