D.D. Richardson v. Com.
22 M.D. 2017
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | Nov 6, 2017Background
- Petitioner David D. Richardson filed a petition in this Court’s original jurisdiction seeking a declaratory judgment that Pa.R.C.P. No. 240 governs in forma pauperis (IFP) determinations and that an IFP-related dismissal does not count as a “strike” under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(f)(1) (PLRA Three-Strikes Rule).
- The Office of Attorney General (OAG) filed preliminary objections arguing, among other points, that the Commonwealth/OAG were improper parties, no actual controversy was pleaded, and that an IFP dismissal counts as a PLRA strike.
- The Court focused on the OAG’s third objection: whether the petition alleged an actual, present controversy sufficient to invoke the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA).
- Petitioner asserted he had been barred from proceeding IFP under the PLRA but failed to identify the specific case or provide docket information showing an actionable controversy.
- The Court held that the DJA requires a direct, substantial, and present interest and will not be used to render advisory opinions or anticipate speculative future events; because Petitioner did not allege an actual controversy, dismissal was required.
- The Court sustained the OAG’s third preliminary objection and dismissed the Petition for Review; the remaining objections were not reached. Opinion by Judge Cosgrove (Nov. 6, 2017).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Petitioner pleaded an actual controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act | Richardson alleges he was prevented from proceeding IFP under the PLRA and seeks a declaratory ruling about IFP and PLRA strikes | OAG argues Petitioner failed to plead facts showing an actual, present controversy (no case/docket identified), so DJA relief is improper | Court held Petitioner failed to plead an actual controversy; DJA relief denied and petition dismissed |
| Whether an IFP-related dismissal counts as a PLRA “strike” (substantive issue) | Richardson contends Rule 240 is the proper IFP standard and IFP dismissals should not count as strikes under §6602(f)(1) | OAG contends IFP dismissals can count as PLRA strikes and raised this as a preliminary objection | Court did not reach or decide this substantive issue after sustaining the no-controversy objection |
Key Cases Cited
- Waslow v. Department of Education, 984 A.2d 575 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (declaratory relief requires direct, substantial, present interest; not for speculative or advisory rulings)
- Gulnac by Gulnac v. South Butler County School District, 587 A.2d 699 (Pa. 1991) (declaratory judgment only for real controversies)
- Mueller v. Pennsylvania State Police Headquarters, 532 A.2d 900 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) (pro se pleadings construed liberally)
- Payne v. Department of Corrections, 871 A.2d 795 (Pa. 2005) (interpretation of PLRA provisions; discussed in opinion regarding §6602)