D.B. v. State
289 P.3d 459
Utah2012Background
- D.B. was charged as a principal with theft and criminal trespass for entering a construction site and taking bolt cutters.
- The juvenile court adjudicated D.B. delinquent as an accomplice on both counts.
- The court of appeals affirmed, and the Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari to review notice and preservation issues.
- Trial evidence included J.M.’s testimony showing D.B. found bolt cutters and instructed to throw them over the fence, supporting a theory of theft liability.
- There was no trial evidence implicating D.B. as an accomplice to criminal trespass before the close of evidence; the accomplice theory for trespass arose in the juvenile court’s judgment.
- The Court affirmed the theft adjudication but reversed the trespass adjudication and remanded for a new trial on that charge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether notice for accomplice liability was constitutionally adequate | D.B. had notice via principal-and-accomplice theory; theft notice arose at trial; no notice for trespass before close of evidence. | D.B. lacked adequate notice of any accomplice theory for trespass until judgment; preservation and notice requirements were satisfied by other avenues. | Adequate notice missing for criminal trespass prior to evidence end; notice for theft valid; trespass adjudication reversed. |
| Was the preservation rule satisfied for the trespass claim | Notice arose at judgment, so no pre-judgment objection required; post-judgment motion not necessary. | D.B. failed to preserve the claim during trial or closing; waiver via strategic silence cannot be cured by post-judgment motion. | D.B. did not need to preserve for trespass due to notice arising in judgment; however, failure to preserve affected the trespass claim being reviewed on appeal. |
| Can the State raise accomplice liability for trespass for the first time in closing or on appeal | When evidence supports both principal and accomplice liability, closing may raise accomplice liability. | State may not raise new theory after evidence ends without notice affecting defense; closing rebuttal insufficient for notice. | First-time assertion in closing permissible only if prior notice existed; here it did not for trespass; dismissal on trespass reversed. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Gonzales, 56 P.3d 969 (Utah App. 2002) (accomplice liability and principal liability severed but coextensive liability)
- Stephens v. Borg, 59 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 1995) (Sixth Amendment notice via pretrial to closing arguments and evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Harper, 660 A.2d 596 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (Sixth Amendment notice via adequate notice and absence of misleading conduct)
- State v. Mancine, 590 A.2d 1107 (N.J. 1991) (notice through pretrial discovery or defendant’s testimony; failure to object not prejudicial)
- Commonwealth v. Smith, 482 A.2d 1124 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (adequate notice when liability theory pursued repeatedly during trial)
- Lopez v. State, 886 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994) (liberty interest and preservation exceptions under due process)
