D'AOUST v. Diamond
36 A.3d 941
| Md. | 2012Background
- Petitioner Michelle D'Aoust sued court-appointed trustees Diamond and Brown for breach of fiduciary duty—actual and constructive fraud—and vicarious liability of Rosen Hoover, P.A.
- Trustees were appointed to conduct a judicial sale of Petitioner’s condo at 108 E. Seevue Court, Hickory Hills; the sale occurred May 26, 2005 for $65,000 with no mortgage at the time.
- Petitioner notified a new address (11010 Bowerman Road) but notices were sent to the condominium address, known to the trustees.
- Notice of Sale and related notices were not sent to Petitioner’s last known address, leaving her unaware of the sale and unable to act to prevent it.
- Prior to a hearing on Petitioner’s exceptions, Diamond allegedly told Petitioner that objections would be withdrawn and no hearing was required; the sale was ratified by the court without a hearing on September 14, 2005.
- Lower courts granted/affirmed dismissal on immunity grounds; the Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari to resolve immunity standards and affirm/Reverse on immunities, remanding for proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trustees are protected by qualified immunity for notice and affidavit acts | D'Aoust argues notice/affidavits were ministerial, not discretionary, negating immunity. | Diamond and Brown claim notice and affidavit are discretionary acts within trustee duties and subject to immunity. | Trustees not entitled to immunity for these acts as they were not public officials. |
| Whether immunity shields trustees when hearing on exceptions was withdrawn and sale ratified without a hearing | Failure to provide hearing violates rights; immunity should not shield such conduct. | Discretionary acts within judicial process; immunity applies. | Immunity not available; action reviewed as non-immunized conduct. |
| Whether the Court of Special Appeals' nesting approach is proper | Nesting should not extend immunity to ministerial acts as part of a broader function. | Nesting should apply, subsuming ministerial acts within broader judicial function. | Court rejects nesting approach; immunity analysis requires traditional discretionary/ministerial distinction. |
| Whether the conduct constitutes constructive fraud shielded by immunity | Constructive fraud caused by improper notice should be actionable despite immunity. | Constructive fraud acts are shielded if discretionary. | Constructive fraud not shielded; immunity does not bar this claim as a matter of law. |
| Whether Rosen Hoover, P.A. has vicarious immunity for Diamond and Brown's actions | Employer should be shielded if employees are immune. | Employer lacks independent immunity; vicarious immunity does not apply. | Rosen Hoover not entitled to absolute or qualified immunity; remanded for independent liability analysis. |
Key Cases Cited
- Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271 (1995) (distinguishes absolute judicial immunity from qualified public official immunity)
- Rice v. Dunn, 81 Md. App. 510 (1990) (three-part test for qualified immunity; mistaken framing addressed)
- Tucker v. Woolery, 99 Md. App. 295 (1994) (applied three-part test for immunity in Court of Special Appeals)
- Fox v. Wills, 390 Md. 620 (2006) (non-judicial personnel appointed by courts have no immunity)
- James v. Prince George's County, 288 Md. 315 (1980) (defines public official immunity criteria and discretionary/ministerial distinction)
- de la Puente v. Cnty. Comm'rs of Frederick Cnty., 386 Md. 505 (2005) (sovereign power and public official status framework for immunity)
- Mandel v. O'Hara, 320 Md. 103 (1990) (public official immunity analyzed with malice and discretion context)
- Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) (supreme court on judicial immunity scope and discretionary judgments)