Czeslaw Parzych v. Merrick B. Garland, 2 F.4th 1013

Czeslaw Parzych, a lawful permanent resident, was convicted twice (2011, 2015) under Illinois burglary statute 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) for remaining in storage lockers "with intent to commit theft."
DHS charged him removable as having committed aggravated felonies (burglary; attempted theft) and crimes involving moral turpitude under the INA.
The IJ initially ordered removal without applying categorical analyses; on remand the IJ applied the categorical approach and found Parzych not removable. The Board disagreed, found the Illinois statute divisible as to intent, and required the modified categorical approach.
Using the modified categorical approach, the IJ (and then the Board) concluded Parzych’s charging documents showed convictions for burglary of a storage unit with intent to commit theft, matching generic definitions of burglary/attempted theft, and affirmed removability.
Parzych petitioned for review arguing the statute’s intent provision is not divisible; the Seventh Circuit reviews divisibility de novo and holds under Illinois law the statute’s intent language is a single, indivisible element (alternatives are means), so the modified categorical approach was improperly applied.
Court grants the petition, vacates the removal order, and remands to the Board for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the intent provision of 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) is divisible	Parzych: intent is a single element (any unlawful intent) — alternatives are means, not separate elements	Govt/Board: Illinois cases call intent an "essential" element and treat intent to commit theft vs felony as distinct elements	Court: Not divisible — Illinois law shows alternatives are means; statute treats intent as single element
Whether the modified categorical approach was properly applied to find aggravated-felony attempted theft / CIMT	Parzych: Modified categorical approach inapplicable if statute not divisible, so convictions cannot be treated as categorical attempted theft/aggravated felonies	Govt/Board: Because statute divisible as to intent, modified categorical approach and conviction records can be consulted to match generic offenses	Court: Application of modified categorical approach was error; vacates removal and remands
Whether courts may look to conviction documents/jury instructions absent clear state-law divisibility	Parzych: State law governs divisibility; no need to resort to conviction record where state law is clear	Govt: Trial records and instructions support divisibility and justify modified categorical review	Court: State authoritative law controls; Illinois law is dispositive and does not support divisibility; conviction documents unnecessary to establish divisibility

Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (establishes means-vs-elements divisibility test)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (limits use of modified categorical approach to certain record documents)
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (categorical approach under the INA)
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (definition of generic burglary and categorical framework)
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (applicability of categorical approaches across statutes)
United States v. Glispie, 943 F.3d 358 (7th Cir. 2019) (certified question to Illinois Supreme Court about scope of unlawful entry)
United States v. Garcia, 948 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2020) (interpretation that alternative means do not render a statute divisible)
Najera-Rodriguez v. Barr, 926 F.3d 343 (7th Cir. 2019) (when to consult conviction record if state law unclear)
Smith v. United States, 877 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (discussion of generic burglary elements)