Cyrus Csutoras v. Paradise High School
12 F.4th 960
| 9th Cir. | 2021Background
- Plaintiff Cyrus Csutoras, a student with attention deficit disorder, had a Section 504 plan limited to academic accommodations (extra time and note review); no social accommodations were requested.
- At a high‑school football game, another student assaulted Csutoras, seriously injuring him; the assailant’s motive was unrelated to Csutoras’s disability.
- The school had four adults supervising the game; none observed or stopped the assault; school was unaware of any prior report of harassment of Csutoras.
- Csutoras sued the school under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act seeking money damages, basing liability on Department of Education "Dear Colleague" Letters about bullying and disability harassment.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the school; on appeal the Ninth Circuit considered whether the Dear Colleague Letters are binding law that can lower the usual elements for private damages claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Do the DOE "Dear Colleague" Letters create binding legal obligations in private money‑damages suits? | The Letters should be treated as enforceable obligations that create duties to prevent disability‑based harassment. | The Letters are non‑binding guidance, explicitly disclaim applicability to private damages suits, and do not alter statutory/regulatory elements. | The Letters are not binding for money‑damages suits and cannot change the elements of ADA/Rehab Act private claims. |
| Does OCR's four‑factor test (including "knew or should know") govern private suits for damages? | The four‑factor framework should apply to show schools liable for harassment. | Supreme Court precedent (Davis) requires actual knowledge and deliberate indifference for private damages claims; OCR test is for administrative/injunctive contexts. | The four‑factor test does not apply to private damages claims; Davis’s actual‑knowledge/deliberate‑indifference standard controls. |
| Can the Letters alone make the need for social accommodations "obvious," excusing any request or individualized notice? | The Letters establish constructive notice that disabled students need social accommodations, so failure to adopt them shows discrimination. | Notice must be based on a request, obvious need from facts, or statute/regulation; vague guidance cannot substitute for individualized factual notice. | The Letters cannot, by themselves, make the need "obvious." No request or factual indicia existed here, so no required accommodation was denied. |
| Did the school act with deliberate indifference? | Failure to implement the Letters’ recommendations demonstrates deliberate indifference. | The school had no actual knowledge of prior harassment, investigated promptly, and disciplined the assailant—its response was reasonable. | Plaintiff failed to show actual notice and a clearly unreasonable response; no deliberate indifference as a matter of law. |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (private damages liability requires actual knowledge and deliberate indifference)
- Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001) (deliberate indifference requires knowledge of substantial likelihood of harm and failure to act)
- Mark H. v. Hamamoto, 620 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2010) (elements for reasonable‑accommodation claim under ADA/Rehab Act)
- A.G. v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 815 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing accommodation/request/intent elements)
- T.B. ex rel. Brenneise v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 806 F.3d 451 (9th Cir. 2015) (intent/deliberate‑indifference standard for damages)
- Karasek v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 956 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2020) (deliberate‑indifference inquiry and reasonableness of school response)
- Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (agency guidance rules for deference and binding effect)