Cyr, Danna Presley, 665 S.W.3d 551

Background

Danna Presley Cyr, the child’s mother, was indicted under Texas Penal Code §22.04(a)(1) for recklessly causing serious bodily injury to her child by omission: (1) failing to protect the child from assault by the child’s father and (2) failing to obtain timely medical care after the assault.
The jury charge limited the jury’s consideration to the first paragraph of a one‑count, two‑paragraph indictment; Cyr was convicted at trial.
The Eleventh Court of Appeals reversed, holding the trial court should have submitted a concurrent‑causation instruction under Texas Penal Code §6.04(a), because evidence could have supported a finding that the father’s assault was clearly sufficient to cause the injury while Cyr’s omission was clearly insufficient.
The State Prosecuting Attorney sought discretionary review, arguing §6.04(a) does not apply to omission offenses and that concurrent causation should not shield omissions that breach parental duties.
Justice Yeary filed a dissent: he argues §6.04(a) plainly applies to omissions (since §22.04 treats omission as conduct that can “cause” injury), and that Cyr was entitled to concurrent‑cause instructions on both failure‑to‑protect and failure‑to‑seek‑medical‑care theories; he would affirm the court of appeals.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held (Dissent)
Whether §6.04(a) (concurrent‑cause rule) applies to omission‑based offenses	SPA: §6.04(a) should not apply categorically to omissions; omission offenses punish dereliction of duty irrespective of another actor’s conduct	Yeary (dissent): §22.04 treats omission as conduct that can "cause" a result, so §6.04(a) applies equally to omissions	§6.04(a) applies to omissions; statute’s plain text governs and Legislature should change it if undesired
Whether trial court erred by refusing a concurrent‑cause instruction on failure‑to‑protect theory	Cyr: father’s assault was a concurrent cause clearly sufficient to produce initial injury; Cyr’s failure to protect was clearly insufficient by itself	State/Majority: this is alternative causation / culpability issue, not concurrent causation; foreseeability and culpable mental state are proper queries	Cyr was entitled to the instruction on failure‑to‑protect because father’s act was clearly sufficient and Cyr’s omission clearly insufficient to cause initial injury
Whether trial court erred by refusing a concurrent‑cause instruction on failure‑to‑seek‑medical‑care theory	Cyr: experts said timely care might have mitigated injury, so jury could find father’s act clearly sufficient while Cyr’s omission clearly insufficient to cause any incrementally greater harm	State/Majority: concurrent‑cause analysis does not apply to subsequent medical‑care omissions unless distinct additional injury is shown	Cyr was entitled to the instruction because a rational jury could have found the father’s conduct inevitably would have caused the greater injury and Cyr’s omission was clearly insufficient
Whether indictment/jury unanimity issues arise from combining two omission theories in one count	Defense: combining failure‑to‑protect and failure‑to‑seek‑care may allege two discrete injuries and risk duplicity or unanimity problems	State: not argued here	Dissent notes potential duplicity/unanimity anomalies and suggests separate paragraphs/application might be appropriate; not resolving the issue

Key Cases Cited

Villanueva v. State, 227 S.W.3d 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (injury‑to‑a‑child statute focuses on result caused, not act vs. omission)
Jefferson v. State, 189 S.W.3d 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (same principle: gravamen is the result)
Robbins v. State, 717 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (construing §6.04(a): if another cause is clearly sufficient and defendant’s conduct clearly insufficient, defendant cannot be convicted)
Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (discussing foreseeability and culpability in causation analysis)
Barnette v. State, 709 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (distinguishing alternative cause defenses)
Stuhler v. State, 218 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (jury unanimity required when separate statutorily defined results are alleged)
Cyr v. State, 630 S.W.3d 380 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021) (court of appeals reversed conviction for failure to give concurrent‑cause instruction)