Cynthia Hobbs v. Raymond Hobbs
325835
| Mich. Ct. App. | Feb 14, 2017Background
- Cynthia and Raymond Hobbs executed an antenuptial agreement days before their 1998 marriage; it designated premarital assets (including premarital retirement plans) as separate, treated postmarital earned income as marital, and waived any right to alimony.
- The agreement included schedules of separate assets and a clause permitting Raymond to segregate postmarital retirement contributions and to retain records documenting postmarital contributions/growth.
- Over 14 years of marriage, Raymond allegedly became controlling and physically abusive; Cynthia testified she was coerced into paying marital expenses from her separate funds and was scared to leave.
- Raymond commingled marital income into his University of Michigan retirement accounts and did not provide full documentation of pre- versus postmarital contributions/growth; he sought a coverture division at trial.
- Cynthia filed for divorce in 2012 and argued enforcement of the antenuptial agreement would be inequitable based on abuse, nondisclosure, and changes in circumstances; the trial court (after a bench trial) treated the commingled retirement accounts as marital, invalidated parts of ¶¶3(c), 3(d) and ¶7(c) (alimony waiver), and denied attorney fees without explaining findings.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s substantive rulings (commingling and invalidation of the alimony waiver) but remanded for the trial court to make brief, definite findings on the attorney-fee requests.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Cynthia) | Defendant's Argument (Raymond) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Denial of Raymond’s early motion for summary disposition | Motion was premature; discovery might show changed circumstances, nondisclosure, duress | Agreement was voluntary and untainted; court should enforce prenup as a matter of law | Denial was proper because further discovery could reasonably support Cynthia’s claims; no error in denying without prejudice |
| 2. Division of commingled retirement accounts (coverture vs. treating as marital) | Commingling and Raymond’s conduct made strict enforcement inequitable; assets should be treated marital | Coverture factor should be used to apportion marital vs. separate portions per prenup expectations | Court did not err treating the commingled U‑M retirement accounts as marital and dividing equally because parties provided no forensic accounting required by the prenup and both effectively sought a remedy outside strict enforcement |
| 3. Enforceability of alimony/spousal-support waiver (¶7c) | Waiver should be invalidated because unforeseeable postmarital domestic abuse and financial effects made enforcement unfair | Waiver is valid; prenup bars any spousal support claims | Court did not abuse discretion in invalidating the waiver: abuse was found credible, unforeseeable, and directly affected Cynthia’s financial situation, making enforcement unfair |
| 4. Attorney-fee rulings | Trial court summarily denied Cynthia’s fee request without findings; remand required for articulated reasons | Both parties sought fees; trial court’s summary denial was sufficient | Trial court’s unexplained denial was inadequate; remand ordered for brief, definite findings on attorney fees (MCR 2.517; Myland guidance) |
Key Cases Cited
- Allard v. Allard, 308 Mich App 536 (appellate standard for invalidating prenup where changed circumstances relate to agreement provisions)
- Reed v. Reed, 265 Mich App 131 (standards for voiding prenuptial agreements: fraud/duress, unconscionability, or changed circumstances)
- Rinvelt v. Rinvelt, 190 Mich App 372 (recognition that antenuptial agreements governing property division are enforceable)
- Vander Veen v. Vander Veen, 229 Mich App 108 (describes coverture-factor approach for apportioning pension/retirement benefits)
- Woodington v. Shokoohi, 288 Mich App 352 (standard: appellate review of trial court refusal to enforce an antenuptial agreement is for abuse of discretion)
- Myland v. Myland, 290 Mich App 691 (MCR 3.206(C)(2)(a) and standards for awarding attorney fees in divorce; inability to pay/need to prosecute or defend)