Cynthia Abron v. Uzochi Obioha
09-20-00126-CV
| Tex. App. | Nov 4, 2021Background
- Cynthia Abron sued Dr. Uzochi Obioha for negligence, gross negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from medical treatment Obioha provided while employed at Parkland Health & Hospital System.
- Obioha moved to dismiss under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.106(f), asserting she was a Parkland employee acting within the scope of employment and that Abron had effectively sued her in her official capacity.
- Record included Obioha’s affidavit and an employment verification letter confirming Parkland employment and scope-of-employment treatment.
- Abron responded that her intentional‑tort and gross‑negligence claims are not within the TTCA waiver and that Parkland is statutorily immune under § 101.021, so § 101.106(f) should not apply.
- The trial court dismissed Abron’s suit for failure to elect remedies under § 101.106(f) after Obioha’s motion; Abron appealed.
- The court of appeals affirmed, holding § 101.106(f) applies where the employee shows she is a governmental employee, the conduct was within scope, and the claims could have been brought against the governmental unit under the TTCA (even if immunity would bar recovery).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether dismissal under §101.106(f) was improper because the third prong (suit could have been brought against the governmental unit) was not met | Abron: trial court found her causes statutorily barred against Parkland, so suit could not have been brought against the governmental unit | Obioha: Franka and other authorities hold employee need not prove waiver; for §101.106(f) it is enough that the tort allegations are the type of claims that fall under the TTCA framework | Held: Overruled—court held the claims "could have been brought" against Parkland for §101.106(f) purposes even if TTCA immunity would bar recovery; dismissal proper |
| Whether gross negligence and intentional-infliction claims are outside §101.106(f)/TTCA for dismissal purposes | Abron: gross negligence and intentional tort not waived by TTCA, so employer could not be sued; statute should not force election | Obioha: All tort theories against a governmental unit are treated under the TTCA for §101.106(f) purposes | Held: Overruled—intentional and gross‑negligence claims still satisfy the §101.106(f) "could have been brought" requirement |
| Whether §101.106(f) was intended to give governmental doctors blanket immunity from malpractice claims | Abron: legislative intent was not to provide blanket immunity to government-employed physicians | Obioha: (relied on statutory text and case law) | Held: Abron’s argument inadequately briefed; court declined to accept it and overruled the issue |
Key Cases Cited
- Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. 2011) (employee need not show waiver of governmental immunity to obtain dismissal under §101.106(f))
- Garza v. Harrison, 574 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2019) (§101.106 election‑of‑remedies framework and effect of official‑capacity pleading)
- Laverie v. Wetherbe, 517 S.W.3d 748 (Tex. 2017) (requirements to obtain dismissal under §101.106(f))
- Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. 2008) (TTCA is the only avenue for common‑law recovery against governmental units)
- Newman v. Obersteller, 960 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. 1997) (§101.106 bars intentional‑tort and gross‑negligence actions against employees sued in official capacity)
- Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT‑Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2002) (sovereign/governmental immunity principles)