Curtis Walker v. Dan Cromwell, 140 F.4th 878

Curtis Walker was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide at age 17 for killing a police officer and was sentenced in Wisconsin state court to life in prison, with parole eligibility set for when he would be 95 years old.
Nearly twenty years after Walker’s sentencing, the U.S. Supreme Court issued key decisions curbing life without parole sentences for juveniles (Graham, Miller, Montgomery, and Jones).
Walker sought postconviction relief in state court, arguing his sentence was a de facto life without parole and violated the Eighth Amendment given his juvenile status and potential for reform.
The Wisconsin courts, and subsequently the federal district court, denied Walker’s claims, with the district court also initially deeming his federal habeas petition untimely.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit chose to resolve the substance of Walker’s Eighth Amendment claim, deferring the timeliness issue.
The Seventh Circuit ultimately affirmed denial of habeas relief, finding that the state court’s adjudication was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.

Issue	Walker’s Argument	Cromwell’s Argument	Held/Outcome
Eighth Amendment: De facto LWOP for juvenile	His sentence is unconstitutionally harsh for a corrigible juvenile and violates Montgomery’s substantive rule	Judge exercised discretion and considered youth; sentencing was individualized as required	Individualized discretionary sentencing suffices under Jones and Miller; no clearly established categorical rule to the contrary
Whether Montgomery established a categorical bar	Montgomery bars life without parole for corrigible juveniles, even where discretion was exercised	Montgomery only makes Miller’s rule (mandatory LWOP bar) retroactive; does not extend to discretionary sentences	No clear, categorical prohibition established by Supreme Court extends to discretionary sentences for corrigible juveniles
AEDPA deference - clearly established law	State court’s application of law was unreasonable given the Supreme Court’s substantive rule	Reasonable jurists could interpret Supreme Court law otherwise; no clear rule violated	AEDPA precludes relief as no unreasonable application or contradiction of Supreme Court precedent
Timeliness of Habeas Petition	Entitled to argue for equitable tolling/exceptions; merits and timing intertwined	No explicit argument (district court sua sponte dismissal)	Court opted to resolve on merits; did not affirm on timeliness grounds

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Eighth Amendment bars life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders; requires meaningful opportunity for release)
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders; requires individualized sentencing)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (Miller applies retroactively on collateral review; discusses substantive bar for corrigible juveniles)
Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98 (2021) (No requirement for a finding of permanent incorrigibility before discretionary life without parole for juveniles)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (Defining "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" under AEDPA)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA standard is highly deferential; relief only for unreasonable state court errors)